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1. Introduction 
While stock returns in the United States this past century have exceeded 
Treasury returns by an average of about 6% annually, in the last few years 
they have done so by more than 12% annually. Commentators  have sug- 
gested  a variety of explanations  for the dramatic stock-market run-up that 
accompanied  these high returns. The baby boom is entering peak savings 
years,  productivity  has  escalated  worldwide  due  to  technological  im- 
provements  and political change,  and stock-market participation rates are 
on the rise. The growth of mutual funds has lowered transaction costs and 
made  diversification  feasible.  Public awareness  of the benefits  of stock- 
market investing  is high.  On the other hand,  irrational exuberance could 
be fueling  the price rise, with inexperienced  investors  expecting  double- 
digit  returns  to continue  indefinitely  or at least  long  enough  to reap a 
substantial  gain. 
Whether  the price rise is due primarily to fundamentals  or whether  it 
is  the  result  of  a bubble  is  important  to policymakers  concerned  with 
avoiding  the real disruption  a sharp stock-market decline  could precipi- 
tate. It is also important to the academic debate over the determinants  of 
stock valuations.  Because this paper is about the relations between  stock 
prices and fundamentals,  we emphasize  three broad categories of expla- 
nations  for the recent price rise: changes  in corporate earnings  growth, 
changes  in consumer  preferences,  and changes  in stock-market participa- 
tion  patterns.  The  goal  in  qualifying  the  importance  of  fundamental 
effects  is to better understand  whether  a combination  of fundamentals 
and  statistical  fluctuation  can  plausibly  explain  the  observed  magni- 
tudes,  or whether  a bubble is the likely cause of the price rise. 
The  paper  has  benefited  from  the  comments  of  John  Campbell,  Annette  Vissing- 
J0rgensen,  and  participants  of the  1999 NBER Macroeconomics  Annual  Conference.  We 
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Although  the paper touches on a variety of issues,  its main contribution 
is to look more closely at how participation patterns have changed,  and at 
how  they  are expected  to affect required returns in a stochastic  equilib- 
rium model.  We interpret participation broadly to include  both the frac- 
tion of the population  that holds any stocks, and the degree of diversifica- 
tion of a typical stockholder. To review the evidence,  we use data from the 
Survey  of  Consumer  Finances  (SCF) to  document  changes  in  stock- 
holding  patterns  and reported  attitudes  toward  risk from 1989 to 1995. 
Consistent  with previous  studies  (e.g.,  Poterba, 1993; Vissing-Jorgensen, 
1997), we  see an increasing  rate of stock-market participation  over time. 
Participation  rates among  the wealthy,  who  own  the majority of stock, 
however,  have increased only slightly. Foreign participation changes  may 
also  influence  required  returns.  Using  data from the U.S.  Treasury, we 
find that net purchases of stocks by foreigners have been relatively high in 
recent years, but small in comparison  with total trading volume.  Finally, 
flow-of-funds  data show that diversification has increased markedly, with 
large outflows  of individual stocks from household  portfolios moving  into 
mutual  funds  and other institutional  accounts. 
To quantify  the  potential  impact  of  these  changes,  we  calibrate  an 
overlapping-generations  model  that allows  for considerable  heterogene- 
ity in the cross section of nonmarketable  income risk, preferences,  diversi- 
fication, and participation.  This extends  the analyses  of Basak and Cuoco 
(1998), Saito (1995), and Vissing-Jorgensen  (1997), all of whom  consider 
the  effect  of participation  when  traded  securities  span  income  realiza- 
tions. We use this framework to experiment with changes in stock-market 
participation  rates, changes  in background  risk, changes  in preferences, 
and changes  in the expected  dividend  process reflecting changes  in diver- 
sification.  We find  that for realistic changes  in raw participation  rates, 
expected  stock  returns  change  very  little.  Within  the  range  of  risk- 
aversion  parameters normally  considered,  preference  changes  also have 
little  effect  on  expected  return differentials.  Changing  the  rate of time 
preference  has  a significant  effect on the level  of all returns,  but not on 
the differential between  stock and bond returns. One factor that appears 
to have  a significant  effect on required returns is the degree  of assumed 
diversification.  This suggests  that one  fundamental  reason for the stock 
price run-up may be the rapid growth of mutual funds and the accompany- 
ing large increase in diversification. 
The remainder  of the paper  is organized  as follows.  In Section  2 we 
review  the  statistical  evidence  on whether  the  current stock price level 
is anomalous.  In Section  3, we  discuss  some  possible  explanations  for 
the stock price increase  in the context  of a simple  discounted-cash-flow 
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changes  in stock-market  participation patterns.  The influence  of partici- 
pation  rates,  extent  of  diversification,  background  income  risk,  and 
preferences  on stock prices is examined  in Section 4 in an overlapping- 
generations  model.  By considering  a variety  of  scenarios  reflecting  si- 
multaneous  changes  in several  of these  factors,  we  show  that changes 
in fundamentals  can account  for perhaps  half of the  observed  increase 
in price-dividend  ratios in the model.  Section  5 concludes. 
2.  Empirical  Facts 
Historically stocks have returned a substantial premium over bonds.  Over 
the period  1871 to 1998, the average annual (log) real return on a broad- 
based  index  of U.S.  stocks was  7.3%, compared  to an average  (log) real 
return on bonds of about 3%.1  The return on stocks over the last few years 
has exceeded  this historical average. For example,  since 1991, the average 
real return on stocks was  17% per year. This has led many  observers  to 
question  whether  expected  returns looking  forward are lower  than they 
have been in the past. 
A related issue  is the composition  of recent returns, which  have been 
mostly  the  result  of  capital  gains  rather than  increased  dividend  pay- 
ments.  To illustrate this,  Figure 1 plots  the ratios of prices to dividends 
and  prices  to  earnings  for aggregate  U.S.  stocks.  (For the  years  since 
1926 this is based  on the S&P 500 index.)  Notice that the price-dividend 
ratio for this index  has increased  to an unprecedented  level  since about 
1995. The increase  in  this  ratio is  significant  because  in  a discounted- 
cash-flow  model  of  stock  valuation,  it indicates  a reduction  in  the  ex- 
pected  rate of  return  or an  increase  in  the  dividend  growth  rate  (see 
Section 3). Because dividends  are discretionary  and only one of the ways 
in which  corporations  distribute  cash  to shareholders,  it may be more 
informative  to look at price-earnings  ratios. Figure 1 also shows  the ratio 
of prices to earnings.  This ratio is also at a relatively  high  level,  but the 
change  has not been  as dramatic as for dividends. 
A notable  aspect of the rise in the price-dividend  ratio is that there is 
substantial  evidence  that a large value  of the price-dividend  ratio pre- 
dicts lower  stock returns in the future.  For example,  Table 1 reports the 
results of regressing  annual (log) stock returns on a constant  and the log 
of the price-dividend  ratio lagged  one  year for the period  1887 to 1998. 
Notice that the coefficient on the dividend-price  ratio is negative.  This is 
consistent  with  a large  body  of  evidence  (e.g.,  Campbell  and  Shiller, 
1988; Hodrick,  1992; Lamont,  1998).  At  the  current  high  level  of  the 
1. Source: Robert Shiller's data, available at http://www.econ.yale.edu/shiller/chapt26.html. 216 *  HEATON  & LUCAS 
Figure 1 PRICE-DIVIDEND  RATIO  AND PRICE-EARNINGS  RATIO, 
1871-1998 
Price-Dividend  Ratio, _ ..  Price-Earnings  Ratio 
2000 
price-dividend  ratio, this regression  predicts a substantial  decline  in the 
stock  market over  the next  year.  In fact, since  1995 this  regression  has 
consistently  predicted  a decline  in the stock market. 
On the other hand,  due to the substantial variability in stock returns, it 
is possible  that the recent returns are within  the bounds  of normal statis- 
Table 1  REGRESSION  OF ONE- 
YEAR  STOCK  RETURNS 
ON LAGGED  P/D OVER 
THE  PERIOD  1871  TO 1998 
Coefficient  Estimate  Standard  Errora 
a  0.28  0.02 
/3  -0.07  0.05 
logRS+1 =  a +  ,3log(Pt/D,) +  Et. 
aCorrected  for conditional heteroskedasticity 
and autocorrelation using  the  procedure of 
Newey and West (1987)  and two years of lags. Stock  Prices  and  Fundamentals  *  217 
tical fluctuations,  without  any  change  in  the  underlying  driving  pro- 
cesses.  For example,  the  standard  deviation  of the  annual  premium  of 
stock returns over bond  returns over  the period  1871 to 1998 was  18%. 
Therefore,  it is not improbable  that one would  observe  several  years of 
premiums  in excess of 20% per year, even with no change in the underly- 
ing statistical process.  Since there is not a statistically  definitive  answer 
to the question  of whether  returns have been abnormally high,  we focus 
below  on whether  recent changes  in various  aspects of the economy  are 
large enough  to suggest  a fundamental  change  in expected  returns. 
3.  Possible  Explanations 
In this section,  we  discuss  some  of the potential  explanations  that have 
been  offered for the stock price run-up,  and begin to evaluate  their likely 
quantitative  importance  in the context of a simple  discounted-cash-flow 
model.  We also present  some  evidence  on changes  in market participa- 
tion patterns that may be influencing  required returns. 
3.1. GORDON  GROWTH  MODEL 
The  Gordon growth model is  perhaps  the  simplest  fundamentals-based 
approach  to  predicting  stock  prices.2  In  this  model,  stock  prices  are 
based  on the discounted  present  value  of future expected  dividend  pay- 
ments.  It is assumed  that dividends  grow, on average,  at a constant rate, 
g,  and  investors  discount  dividends  at  a constant  rate,  r. Dividends, 
earnings,  and growth  are connected  by two  equations:  DIV =  (1 -  p)E 
and g = p(ROE), where  DIV is dividends,  E is earnings,  p is the propor- 
tion of earnings  reinvested,  and ROE is the marginal physical product of 
capital. If the marginal physical  product  of capital is constant,  and if the 
fraction of reinvested  earnings is constant,  then,  all else equal,  dividend 
growth  is constant.  Then the price-dividend  ratio equals  1/(r -  g). 
The model  highlights  two  of the fundamental  reasons  that the price- 
dividend  ratio  can  change.  The  first  is  due  to  changes  in  dividend 
growth,  reflected  in  the  choice  of g.  The  second  is  due  to  changes  in 
preferences  that affect the subjective  rate of time preference  or the pre- 
mium  demanded  for risk, reflected in the choice of r. 
Expectations of g may be higher than in the past for several reasons.  A 
major determinant  of  dividend  growth  is  the  availability  of  profitable 
investment  projects.  The  potential  for  sustained  economic  growth  in 
excess  of  historical  precedent  has  been  attributed  to  the  opening  and 
2. This valuation  model, a staple of market  analysts, is described, for instance, in Brealey 
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integration of world markets, continuing  technological  advances,  and an 
increasingly  educated  labor force.  In fact, U.S.  per capita GDP growth 
has  been  slightly  higher  than  average  in recent years,  averaging  2.3% 
from 1995 to 1998, compared  with  2.0% from 1947 to 1998. 
Other  considerations  suggest  that  r may  be  lower  than  in  the  past. 
One  possibility  is  that  aggregate  preferences  have  changed.  Either  a 
decrease  in risk aversion  or an increase  in patience  could  contribute  to 
the run-up  in stock prices.  Risk aversion  could  vary across generations 
due  to their varying  experiences  and circumstances.  For example,  baby 
boomers  do not share their parents' first-hand experience  with the Great 
Depression.  Some  have  argued  that the economy  is more stable,  reduc- 
ing  the exposure  to background  risk, and possibly  reducing  the  risk to 
dividends.  Davis  and Willen  (1998) show,  for example,  that the income 
risk for households  with  various  educational  attainments  has  changed 
over time. Reduced  transaction costs in financial markets make diversifi- 
cation easier, which,  as discussed  below,  can reduce effective  aversion to 
the risk of holding  stocks as people  hold more diversified  portfolios. 
It should  be noted  that these  types  of changes  affect the risk-free rate 
as well as the expected  return on stocks.  Since the risk-free rate has been 
relatively stable over the period of the recent stock price run-up,  in much 
of  what  follows  we  focus  on  factors  that  affect  the  equity  premium, 
rather than the absolute  level of rates.3 
The Survey of Consumer  Finances (SCF) is one of the few data sources 
that provides  some  direct survey  evidence  on peoples'  attitude  towards 
financial risk and how  it has changed  over time. Respondents  to the SCF 
answer  detailed  questions,  both quantitative  and qualitative,  about their 
financial  situation.  The  survey  is  conducted  by  the  Federal  Reserve 
Board every three years,  with  different households  in each survey  year. 
Here we  focus  on the question: 
Which  of the statements  on this page comes  closest to the amount offinancial risk 
that you (and your husband/wife)  are willing to take when you save or make 
investments? If more than one box checked,  code smallest category  #. 
1.  take  substantialfinancial risks expected  to earn substantial returns 
2.  take  above  averagefinancial  risks expecting to earn above  average  returns 
3.  take  averagefinancial risks expecting to earn average  returns 
4.  not willing to take  any financial risks 
3. See Blanchard (1993) for an analysis of historical trends in the equity premium  and risk- 
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Table  2  AVERAGE  RESPONSE  BY  AGE  AND SURVEY  YEAR  TO 
QUESTIONS  ABOUT  RISK  AVERSION  FROM  THE  SCF. 
Responsea 
Year  Age < 35  35-65  >65 
1989  3.14 (0.88)  3.32 (0.77)  3.63 (0.61) 
1992  3.19 (0.84)  3.26 (0.81)  3.64 (0.60) 
1995  3.07 (0.87)  3.18 (0.82)  3.58 (0.68) 
aImplied  population  standard  deviations  in parentheses. 
Table 2 reports the average response  by age and survey year. The implied 
population  standard deviation  across responses  is reported in parenthe- 
ses.  Since the population  represented  by the survey totals approximately 
90 million households,  the standard errors of the estimates  of the means 
are  quite  small.  Consistent  with  the  idea  that  risk  tolerance  has  in- 
creased,  the average reported aversion  to risk has decreased  slightly  for 
each age  category  over time.  Older households  own  significantly  more 
stock  than  younger  households,  and  reported  risk  aversion  increases 
with  age  in each  survey  year.  When  a similar tabulation  (not reported 
here) is done  conditional  on households  that own  at least $500 in stocks, 
the  same  patterns  emerge  with  respect  to  age  and  time.  The  average 
reported level of risk tolerance, however,  is higher when we condition  on 
stockholders.  For instance, in 1995 the average risk attitude for stockhold- 
ers over age 65 was 3.17, as compared  to 3.58 for all households  over 65. 
This suggests  that those  who  already own  stocks are more risk-tolerant 
as a group  than nonparticipants.  Hence,  the entry of new  stockholders 
may  slightly  decrease  the  average  level  of  risk  tolerance.  One  would 
expect  this to mitigate  the  effect  of wider  participation  in reducing  the 
equity premium. 
There are objective reasons why  the underlying  subjective rate of time 
preference  also  may  be  changing.  Increases  in life  expectancy  beyond 
retirement  would  likely  increase  the  incentive  to  save  and  thereby  re- 
duce required returns. Mortality, for example,  has declined  at an average 
annual rate of 3.3% over the period 1900 to 1988 (Social Security Adminis- 
tration). Past improvements  in health  and life expectancy  might  under- 
state expected  improvements  in these  factors that are premised  on con- 
tinued medical progress.4 As with  the other explanations  considered  for 
the stock price run-up,  however,  it is hard to point to events  that would 
4. In fact, there  is a lively  debate  in the  demographic  literature on these  questions,  with 
some  authors claiming that a life expectancy  at birth of 100 years will be realized early in 
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trigger a large change  in aggregate  preferences  over the course of only a 
few years. 
Calibrating the Gordon growth  model  gives  a rough  sense  of how  far 
earnings  growth  rates or stock returns would  have to deviate  from their 
historical  averages  to justify  current price levels.  This approach  has  the 
advantage  that  it allows  one  to avoid  taking  a definitive  stand  on  the 
magnitude  of technology  or preference parameter changes.  In the tabula- 
tions presented  here,  we  focus  on earnings-adjusted  price-dividend  ra- 
tios rather than actual price-dividend  ratios because earnings are likely to 
be a more stable proxy for long-run payments  to shareholders.  Consistent 
with  the average  ratio of dividends  to earnings  over the period  1947 to 
1997, we  assume  an average  reinvestment  rate of 50%. Hence,  the  ad- 
justed  price-dividend  ratio is defined  as twice the price-earnings  ratio.5 
Over the past century, real earnings  growth  has averaged  about 1.4% 
annually,  with  a standard  deviation  of  about  25%. Table 3 shows  the 
required  growth  rate in the  future  to  match  current and  historical  ad- 
justed  price-dividend  ratios, for various levels  of required returns. For r 
ranging  from  5% to  15%, column  2 reports  the  growth  rate g  that  is 
consistent  with  the  adjusted  price-dividend  ratio of 28 for the  period 
1872 to 1998. Column  3 reports  the growth  rate necessary  to match the 
adjusted  price-dividend  ratio of 48 in January 1998 (the ratio in January 
1999 is even  higher  at 58). For instance,  to realize  a real stock return of 
7% (consistent  with  a 6% equity  premium  and a 1% real risk-free rate) 
and to match the  average  historical  adjusted  price-dividend  ratio of 28 
requires  growth  of  3.4%.  To match  the  1998 adjusted  price-dividend 
ratio of 48, assuming  a real risk-free rate of 3% and an equity premium  of 
6%, requires perpetual  growth of 6.9%. This is a large number by histori- 
cal standards,  suggesting  that,  at least in this simple  model,  a plausible 
increase  in the expected  long-run  growth  rate is unlikely  to be the sole 
explanation  for the increase in stock prices. 
The  growth  rate  and  required  return  enter  symmetrically  in  these 
calculations.  Therefore, another interpretation  of the results in Table 3 is 
that if growth  rates are expected  to be similar to historical averages,  the 
expected  real return  on  the  stock  market  is now  less  than  5%. Again 
assuming  a risk-free return of 3%, this implies  an equity premium below 
2%. This large a change  in expected  returns also seems  unlikely  to have 
taken place over the period  of only a few years. 
One  shortcoming  of  this  model  is  the  restriction  that  the  expected 
5. While  stock prices  depend  on the long-run  behavior  of dividends,  properly  measured, 
in  the  short  run  dividends  can vary  due  to  temporary  changes  in payout  policy  (for 
instance,  in response  to changes  in the tax law).  Therefore, it is common  to focus on the 
price-earnings  ratio,  adjusted  for reinvestment  rates,  to approximate  long-run  price- 
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Table  3  GROWTH  RATES  IMPLIED  BY  THE  GORDON  GROWTH  MODEL 
Ten-Year  g to 
Long-Run  g to  Long-Run  g to  Match  1998  P/E 
rs  Match  Historical  P/E  Match  1998  P/E  with  2%  Tail 
0.05  0.014  0.029  0.064 
0.07  0.034  0.049  0.134 
0.09  0.054  0.069  0.189 
0.11  0.074  0.089  0.236 
0.13  0.094  0.109  0.280 
0.15  0.114  0.129  0.320 
growth  rate is constant.  This assumption,  however,  can be relaxed quite 
easily. A minor variation on the model  is to assume  a higher growth  rate 
for  some  number  of  years,  followed  by  a return  to  a lower  long-run 
growth  rate. Column 4 of Table 3 reports, for each value of r in column  1, 
the  growth  rate over  10 years  necessary  to explain  the  adjusted  price- 
dividend  ratio in January 1998. The calculation  assumes  that the growth 
rate returns to the long-run  average  of 2% from year 10 onward.  In this 
case  achieving  a 9% average  rate  of  return  requires  a growth  rate  of 
18.9% for ten years! 
Although  these  calculations  are admittedly  primitive,  more  detailed 
analyses  along  similar  lines  produce  qualitatively  similar  conclusions. 
For instance,  Lee and Swaminathan  (1999) estimate the value  of individ- 
ual  stocks  in  the  Dow  Jones  Industrial  Average,  projecting  cash  flows 
using  accounting  data and analysts'  forecasts,  and discounting  using  the 
CAPM. They conclude  that the index is about 1.6 times the fundamental 
value  predicted  by their analysis. 
Despite  the  apparently  large  changes  in parameters  necessary  to ex- 
plain current price levels,  these  results  do not preclude  a fundamentals- 
based  explanation.  It is  possible  that  there  have  been  a simultaneous 
increase  in expected  growth  rates and  a reduction  in required  returns. 
For instance,  if the  long-run  growth  rate is realistically  expected  to be 
about 2.4% and if expected  returns fall to about 6.6%, current prices are 
in  line  with  fundamentals.  Our  focus  in  the  rest  of  the  paper  is  on 
whether  such  a change  in expected  returns can be attributed to measur- 
able  changes  in  the  economy,  in  the  context  of an equilibrium  model. 
One  factor of particular interest  is the change  in stock-market  participa- 
tion patterns,  which  is the topic of the next subsection. 
3.2 STOCK-MARKET  PARTICIPATION  PATTERNS 
It is well  documented  that a large fraction of the U.S.  population  holds 
little or no stocks (Bertaut and Haliassos,  1995; Blume and Zeldes,  1993) 222 *  HEATON  & LUCAS 
and that participation  varies  systematically  with  factors such  as wealth 
and  age  (Gentry and Hubbard,  1998; King and Leape,  1987). As noted 
in several  recent studies  (e.g.,  Basak and Cuoco,  1998; Constantinides, 
Donaldson,  and  Mehra,  1998; Saito,  1995; Polkovnichencko,  1998; Vis- 
sing-Jorgensen,  1997), an increase  in the stock-market  participation  rate 
has,  in theory,  the  potential  to decrease  the  required  risk premium  on 
stocks  because  it spreads  market  risk over  a broader  population.6  Not 
only  has  the  number  of  participants  been  rising,  but  the  nature  of 
participation  has  changed.  A typical  stockholder  today  has  a more  di- 
versified  portfolio  than in the past,  presumably  due to the lower  cost of 
diversification.  Thus,  the effective  risk of the typical portfolio  may have 
declined.  In this  subsection,  we  review  some  of the evidence  on these 
changes. 
The best  source  of  data  on  market participation  rates in  the  United 
States  is  perhaps  the  SCF, which  reports  detailed  information  about 
household  wealth  composition  every  three  years.  Using  these  data, 
Poterba (1998) reports that in 1995 there were  approximately  69.3 million 
shareholders  in the United  States,  compared  to 61.4 million  in 1992 and 
52.3 million  in 1989. There is also evidence  that people  are entering  the 
market  at a younger  age.  Poterba and  Samwick  (1997) show  that baby 
boomers  are  participating  more  heavily  in  the  market  than  previous 
generations  at a similar  age.  Baby boomers  are entering  peak  savings 
years and directing some of their savings  into stocks.  More generally, the 
aging  of  the  population  should  result  in  a greater demand  for stocks, 
since  older people  hold  proportionally  more of their wealth  in the mar- 
ket than do younger  people  (see,  e.g.,  Heaton  and Lucas, 1998). Finally, 
foreign  participation  in the U.S.  markets has increased,  further spread- 
ing the risk across a broader population. 
Market participants are also holding  more diversified  portfolios,  which 
reduces their exposure  to risk from their stockholdings.  This is potentially 
important,  since  holders  of diversified  portfolios  may  demand  a lower 
average  return.  Historical  evidence  on  this  phenomenon  of improving 
diversification  is summarized  in Allen and Gale (1994). Friend and Blume 
(1975) found  that a large proportion  of investors  had  only  one  or two 
stocks in their portfolios and very few had more than ten. At the time, this 
lack of diversification in individual  stockholdings  could not be justified by 
the  claim  that  these  investors  achieved  diversification  through  unre- 
ported mutual-fund  holdings.  In fact, King and Leape (1984) found  that 
6. Bakshi and Chen  (1994) note that to the extent that demographic  changes  have  an effect 
on  the  demand  for stocks,  they  will  have  a predictable  effect  on  asset  prices.  Bodie, 
Merton,  and  Samuelson  (1992) provide  a theoretical  justification  for the  demand  for 
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only 1% of investors'  wealth  was in mutual funds at around that time. In 
contrast, Poterba (1998) reports a sharp increase in the proportion of stock 
held in mutual funds over time and a reduction in directly held stocks. For 
instance,  while  the total number  of individuals  holding  stock increased 
from 61.4 million to 69.3 million from 1992 to 1995, the number of individu- 
als holding  stock directly fell from 29.2 million  to 27.4 million  over the 
same period.  In the calibrations presented  below, we will look at whether 
this  diversification  effect  is  significant  by  comparing  stock  prices  with 
different  underlying  assumptions  about dividend  volatility, where  high 
assumed  dividend  volatility  proxies for less diversification. 
Although  these  statistics  point  to  an increase  in participation  and  a 
reduction  in risk exposure,  it is  questionable  how  significant  these  ef- 
fects are quantitatively.  The change  from 52 million  to 69 million partici- 
pants is a 33% increase, but when  the numbers  are wealth-weighted,  the 
increase is much smaller. Now  as in the past,  the vast majority of stocks 
are held by wealthy  individuals.  For instance,  Poterba (1998) finds that in 
the 1995 SCF, 82% of stock was held by households  with a stock portfolio 
exceeding  $100,000,  and  54% of  stock  was  held  by  households  with 
annual  income  over  $100,000.  This suggests  that stockholdings  remain 
extremely concentrated.  Figures 2 and 3 present  a more complete  picture 
of  how  the  distribution  of  stockholdings  vs.  wealth  and  income  has 
changed  over the period  1989 to 1995 (see also Table 4). Using  data from 
the SCF, we plot the share of stocks held  against the share of income  or 
wealth.  Stockholding  looks  more democratic when  measured  relative to 
income  than  relative  to  wealth,  since  as  noted  in  Vissing-J0rgensen 
(1997), lower-labor-income  households  own  a larger share of the market 
than  in the  past.  When  the  metric is wealth,  however,  there  has  been 
very little change-holdings  were  and are extremely  concentrated. 
Table  4  PROPORTION  OF POPULATION  THAT  HOLDS  STOCK  BY 
WEALTH  COHORT 
Percentile  Range  Proportion  Range  Proportion 
Range  (%)  ($)  (%)  ($)  (%) 
<25  <801  2.3  <1101  4.7 
26-50  801-40,051  13.0  1102-40,500  17.8 
51-75  40,052-121,500  21.6  40,501-126,251  28.7 
76-90  121,501-279,001  36.7  126,252-309,501  47.8 
91-95  279,001-456,000  55.4  309,502-574,000  62.8 
96-99  456,001-1,767,730  65.8  574,001-1,814,330  78.3 
>99  >1,767,730  84.3  >1,814,331  82.0 Figure 2 PERCENTAGE  OF STOCK HELD BY INCOME PERCENTILE 
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Table  5  NET PURCHASES  OF STOCKS  BY  INDIVIDUALS 
Purchases  (billions  of dollars) 
Year  Net  Through  Mutual  Funds  Outside  Mutual  Funds 
1995  -116.1  91.3  -207.4 
1996  -101.9  218.4  -320.3 
1997  -179.0  190.2  -369.2 
Ideally,  one  would  like  to  measure  the  net  investment  in  the  stock 
market in recent years on behalf of households.  If net inflows  were large, 
one could perhaps conclude  that the demand  for stocks had significantly 
increased.  The fact that aggregate  savings  rates are low  is indirect  evi- 
dence that these net inflows  cannot be large. Still, there could be substitu- 
tion  out  of money  and bonds  into  stocks,  increasing  the  net  flow  into 
stocks.  According  to the flow-of-funds  accounts,  U.S. Treasury securities 
are the  only  category  of fixed-income  investment  that had  a large net 
outflow  from the household  sector in recent years. Calculating flows into 
stocks  directly  is  tricky because  there  have  been  large  changes  in  the 
institutional  structure  of  the  investment  industry.  Table 5,  using  data 
from the Investment  Company  Institute,  shows  net purchases  of stocks, 
purchases  made  through  mutual  funds,  and  purchases  made  outside 
mutual funds,  by households,  from 1995 to 1997. While purchases  made 
through  mutual  funds  increased  significantly  over  the period,  net pur- 
chases  of  equities  by  households  were  actually  negative  in each  year. 
This is because  households  were  net  sellers  of equities  to institutions. 
Changes  in  foreign  participation  in  the  U.S.  market may  also  affect 
expected  returns. Assuming  that foreign participants are similar to U.S. 
stockholders  in their attitude  towards  risk and  their ex ante risk expo- 
sure,  an increase in foreign participation  should  lower  expected  returns 
by increasing  opportunities  for diversification.  Net foreign purchases  of 
stock have  spiked  sharply  in recent years  (see  Figure 4),  and  these  in- 
flows,  over the period January 1988 to February 1999, have  a correlation 
of 0.13 with  monthly  returns on the S&P 500. The average  monthly  net 
inflow between  January 1996 and February 1999 is $3.8 billion, compared 
to  only  $349 million  from  the  period  January 1988 to  December  1995. 
Although  the inflows  have  increased  significantly,  they  still represent  a 
small fraction of total market transactions,  which  totaled  approximately 
$479 billion per month  in 1997 on the New  York Stock Exchange alone.7 
7. Data on foreign purchases  and sales of U.S. stocks are from the U.S. Department  of the 
Treasury's  table "TIC  Capital  Movements, U.S. Transactions  with Foreigners  in Long 
Term  Securities."  S&P  500 monthly returns data are from Robert  Shiller.  Total  trading 
volume  is from the NYSE 1997 Fact Book. tc 
a  a: 
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Figure  4 FOREIGN  NET  INVESTMENT  AND RETURNS 
Foreign Net  Stock Investment 






4. An Overlapping-Generations  Model 
In this section,  we ask whether  changing  stock-market participation pat- 
terns  and  increased  diversification  can have  a quantitatively  important 
effect on stock prices in an equilibrium  model.  We calibrate an overlap- 
ping-generations  (OLG) model  in which  agents  face both aggregate  and 
idiosyncratic  income  risk,  and  a variable  subset  of  agents  has  limited 
access to financial markets. 
The effects  of limited  participation  in financial markets has been  con- 
sidered  by  a  number  of  authors,  including  Basak  and  Cuoco  (1998), 
Saito  (1995),  and  Vissing-Jorgensen  (1997). In these  papers,  aggregate 
consumption  is  completely  traded  in  financial  markets  in  the  form  of 
dividends.  Only  a limited  number  of  agents  can  trade  claims  on  this 
dividend  flow  directly. The other agents  participate in financial markets 
only  by  trading  claims  to  risk-free  bonds.  The  result  is  incomplete 
sharing of aggregate  risk, with  stockholders  often taking leveraged  posi- Stock  Prices  and  Fundamentals  *  227 
tions  to  accommodate  the  demand  for bonds  by  nonparticipants.  Be- 
cause  of this,  a larger risk premium  is necessary  to induce  those  in the 
stock market to hold  all of the aggregate  risk. It is difficult to justify the 
magnitude  of the observed  equity  premium  in these  models,  however, 
unless  one  assumes  very  high  risk aversion  or very  low  participation 
rates. 
One  way  to increase  the  effects  of limited  participation  is to include 
other  sources  of  uninsurable  income  risk.  For instance,  income  from 
wages  and/or  privately  held  businesses  constitutes  the  majority  of  in- 
come  for  most  households  (Heaton  and  Lucas,  1998).  These  income 
flows  are  difficult  to  contract  upon,  and  a  large  component  of  this 
income  risk is specific  to each individual  of household.  We refer to the 
sum  of  labor  income  and  privately  held  business  income  as  non- 
marketed  income. Potential  differences  in  the  properties  of  this  income 
for  participants  versus  nonparticipants  are  likely  to  influence  the  ef- 
fects  of  limited  participation  on  asset  returns.  This  is  consistent  with 
the  empirical  observation  that  the  consumption  of  stockholders  is 
more volatile  than that of nonstockholders  (Mankiw and Zeldes,  1991). 
Polkovnichenko  (1998) demonstrates  how  differential  income  risk and 
risk  aversion  can  affect  asset  prices  in  a  model  with  infinite-lived 
heterogeneous  agents.  He  shows  that  a  small  fixed  transaction  cost 
that  endogenously  limits  stock-market  participation  can  interact  with 
idiosyncratic  risk to result in a bigger  equity  premium  than in a repre- 
sentative  agent  model,  although  matching  the  observed  premium  is 
still elusive. 
The model  presented  here allows  us to examine the effect of participa- 
tion  and  diversification  while  considering  a  greater  degree  of  cross- 
sectional  heterogeneity  than in the previous  literature, due to the simpli- 
fying  assumption  of  two-period  lives.  Unlike  the  papers  discussed 
above,  which  focus  on  whether  limited  participation  can  explain  the 
historical  equity  premium,  we  focus  on  the  question  of to what  extent 
observed  changes in participation  rates can explain  the recent run-up  in 
stock  prices.  We also  emphasize  the  effect  of changes  in the  degree  of 
portfolio  diversification. 
4.1 STRUCTURE  OF THE  MODEL 
At each time period,  t, a generation  of J "young" agents are born and live 
for two periods.8  Let C(j,t) be the consumption  of agent j when  young, 
8. Storesletten,  Telmer, and Yaron (1998) consider  an OLG model  in which  the agents  face 
nontradable  idiosyncratic  risk and live for a large number of periods.  We limit ourselves 
to a smaller number of periods  to make numerical  solution  of the model  easier. 228 *  HEATON  & LUCAS 
and C?(j,t + 1) be the consumption  of agent j when  old (j =  1,2,  . . .,  ). 
The utility  specification  for agent j distinguishes  between  risk aversion 
and  the  elasticity  of intertemporal  substitution.  We use  the  parametric 
form proposed  by Epstein and Zin (1989) and Weil (1990): 
U(j,t)  logC(j,t)  +  1  logE[CO(j,t  +  1)1-  |  i(t)],  (1) 
1-aj 
where  3j  > 0 and aj > 0. Here  ;(t) is the information available at time t and 
is assumed  to be common  across agents.  As discussed  by Epstein and Zin 
(1989), the  parameter  aj is the  coefficient  of relative  risk aversion.  The 
elasticity  of  intertemporal  substitution  equals  one.  In the  experiments 
considered  below,  changes  in participation affect the equilibrium volatil- 
ity of individual  consumption  in the second period. In general, this affects 
both the level of interest rates and the equity premium.  By distinguishing 
between  risk aversion and the elasticity of intertemporal substitution,  the 
effect  of the  income  process  on  the  equity  premium  is to some  extent 
separated  from its effect on the risk-free rate. 
Each agent j(j  =  1,2,  .  . .,  J) is endowed  with  random  nonmarketed 
income  Y(j,t)  at  time  t and  random  nonmarketed  income  Y?(j,t +  1) 
when  old  at time  t +  1. The details  of the individual  income  processes 
are described below.  The agents trade in financial markets in an attempt 
to smooth  consumption  over time.  There are two  securities  that can be 
traded:  a stock  and  a risk-free bond.  At  time  t the  stock  represents  a 
claim to future  dividends  {D(t +  r):  r =  1,2,  . . . }. The total supply  of 
stock is normalized  to one.  The bond is assumed  to be in zero net supply. 
Each agent  is exposed  to nonmarketed  income  risk that has both  an 
aggregate  component  and an idiosyncratic  component.  Aggregate  non- 
marketed  income  at time t is denoted  by Ya(t),  where 
J  J 
ya(t) =  Y(j,t) +  E  Y(j,t).  (2) 
j=l  j=1 
In equilibrium,  this  endowment  plus  dividends  equals  aggregate  con- 
sumption  at time  t. The properties  of individual  nonmarketed  income 
Y(j,t) and Y?(j,t) will be potentially  important  in assessing  the effects  of 
changing  participation  an'd background  income  risk  on  equilibrium 
returns. 
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that depends  on the agent's  access  to financial  markets.  Let PS(t)  be the 
price of the stock at time t, and Pb(t) be the price of a bond that pays one 
unit of consumption  at time  t +  1 for sure.  If agent j has access  to both 
financial markets,  then the agent's  flow wealth  constraints  are 
C(j,t) =  Y(j,t) -  S(j,t)P(t)  -  B(j,t)Pb(t),  (3a) 
C?(j,t +  1) = Y?(j,t +  1) +  S(j,t)[Ps(t +  1) + D(t +  1)] + B(j,t),  (3b) 
where  S(j,t)  gives  the  stockholdings  of  agent  j,  and  B(j,t)  gives  the 
bondholdings  of agent j. A subset  of the agents  is assumed  to have only 
limited  access  to financial markets and can trade only  in bonds.  In this 
case the constraints  (3) are replaced by 
C(j,t)  =  Y(j,t) -  B(j,t)Pb(t),  (4a) 
C?(j,t +  1) =  Y?(j,t +  1) + B(j,t).  (4b) 
An equilibrium is given by processes  for stock and bond prices {Ps(t): t = 
0,1,  .  . } and {Pb(t): t = 0,1,  . . . } such that 
S*(j,t) =  1,  (5a) 
j=l 
B*(j,t) =  0,  (5b) 
j=l 
where {S*(j,t),B*(j,t)} maximizes  (1) subject to (3) if the agent can trade in 
both  markets,  or subject to  (4) if the  agent  can trade only  in the bond 
market. 
We assume  that nonmarketed  income  {Ya(t)  : t =  0,1,  . . . } and divi- 
dend  income  grow  over  time  in  such  a way  that  the  growth  rate  of 
aggregate  income  is  a stationary  process.  Consistent  with  this,  we  as- 
sume that at time t we have Y(j,t) = y(j,t)Ya(t) and D(t) = d(t)Ya(t),  where 
y(j,t)  denotes  the  share  of individual  j's  income  in  aggregate  income, 
and d(t) the  dividend  relative  to aggregate  nonmarketed  income.  Simi- 
larly we  assume  that Y?(j,t) = y?(j,t)Ya(t).  This implies  that one  can look 
for an equilibrium  in which  the  stock  price  also  scales  with  aggregate 
income,  so that PS(t) = ps(t)Ya(t).  Finally, we assume  that the face value of 
a bond  purchased  at time  t is given  by  Ya(t), so that B(j,t)  =  b(j,t)Y'(t), 
where  b(j,t) gives  the quantity  of these  "rescaled" bonds  purchased  by 
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4.2 CALIBRATION 
In this  subsection,  we  calibrate the  model  in order to  revisit  quantita- 
tively  some  of the  questions  discussed  in Section  3. How  much  do  as- 
sumed  changes  in  participation  rates  affect  the  predicted  equity  pre- 
mium  and expected  returns (and hence  prices)? How  does  the degree  of 
portfolio  diversification  affect  required  returns? Can  small  changes  in 
preference  parameters,  reflecting  changes  in patience  or risk aversion, 
result  in  large  changes  in required  returns? How  important  is hetero- 
geneity  in income  risk? To answer  these  questions,  the model  is solved 
numerically  using  standard  techniques.  Although  we  assume  consider- 
able heterogeneity  in the cross section,  the fact that agents  only  live for 
two periods  makes the problem numerically  tractable.9 
We begin  by describing  the parameterization  of the income  processes 
and  preferences.  Parameters are chosen  to reflect limited  stock-market 
participation,  and to try to match gross features of the data with  respect 
to  stock  returns,  the  risk-free  rate,  and  the  driving  processes  for non- 
marketed  income  and dividends. 
As in most  exercises  of this type,  the equity-premium  puzzle  remains 
a serious  problem.  For income  and dividend  processes  and participation 
rates based  on historical data, the model predicts an unrealistically  small 
equity premium.  We have  increased  the assumed  volatility  of aggregate 
income  to increase  the predicted  premium,  but want  to emphasize  that 
this may not be a neutral adjustment with respect to the other quantities 
of interest.10 
4.2.1  Income  and Preferences  Let y(t) =  log[Ya(t)/Y(t -  1)] be the growth 
rate of aggregate nonmarketed  income at time t. Then the aggregate state 
of the  economy  is given  by  z(t)  =  [y(t)  d(t)]', which  is assumed  to be 
generated by a Markov chain. To calibrate a process for z(t) we assume that 
a period corresponds  to 25 years. The first period roughly  corresponds  to 
the working  years between  age 40 and retirement,  and the second  period 
is the time in retirement. Over the period 1889 to 1985, the average annual 
(log) growth rate in real aggregate consumption  was 1.7% with a standard 
deviation  of 3.5%. So that the model  will produce  a nonnegligible  equity 
premium, we assume that the standard deviation  of the aggregate growth 
rate in the model is 1.5 times the historical standard deviation of aggregate 
9. The Matlab code is available upon  request. 
10. Recently  Campbell  and Cochrane  (1998) suggested  that time-varying  habit provides  a 
higher  estimate  of the  equity  premium  in a model  based  on aggregate  consumption. 
However,  Cochrane  (1997) claims that this preference  specification  cannot account  for 
the recent run-up  in stock prices. Stock  Prices  and  Fundamentals  *  231 
consumption.  For  the  same  reason,  we  assume  that  annual  income 
growth  is independently  and identically  distributed  over time,  although 
in fact it is slightly negatively  autocorrelated. This implies a 25-year aver- 
age (log) growth  rate of 42.5% with  a standard deviation  of 17.5%. This 
distribution is discretized by assuming  that y takes on the values 0.16 and 
0.69 with equal conditional  probability. 
The capital share in total income averages approximately  30%. Consis- 
tent with  the  aggregate  statistics  reported  in Heaton  and Lucas (1998), 
we  assume  that only half of this capital income  is actually tradable. The 
nontradable  portion,  generated  by  private  business  holdings,  is  ac- 
counted  for in nonmarketed  income.  Since  dividends  in the model  are 
scaled relative to nonmarketed  income,  this means that we require d(t) to 
average  18%. In most  of the  calculations  d(t) is fixed  at 18%. In other 
experiments  described  below,  we  assume  a more volatile  dividend  pro- 
cess to proxy for a lack of diversification.1 
The relative nonmarketed  income  of young  agent j and of old agent k 
at time t are given by 
y(j,t)  =  E (j,t)[1  -  1(t)],  (6) 
y?(k,t)  =  E?(k,t)n(t),  (7) 
where 
J  J 
E(j,t) =  1  and  f(k,t)  =1.  (8) 
j=1  k=l 
Under  this normalization,  r(t)  gives  the  share  of old  individuals'  non- 
marketed income  in total nonmarketed  income.  The analysis  is sensitive 
to  this  parameter  because  the  amount  of  nonmarketed  income  influ- 
ences  agents'  attitude  towards  the  risk of investment  income.  For the 
basic analyis we  assume  that r1  =  0.2 for all t, reflecting the observation 
that noninvestment  wealth  is relatively small for retirees. In the sensitiv- 
ity analysis,  this parameter is varied to a maximum  of 0.3. 
The  process  for  E(j,t) and  E?(k,t)  captures  idiosyncratic  income  risk 
across  agents.  We  know  from  earlier work  (e.g.,  Constantinides  and 
Duffie,  1996) that  asset  returns  are potentially  sensitive  to  the  persis- 
tence  of idiosyncratic  income  shocks  and  to the  correlation  and  condi- 
tional  covariance  of  idiosyncratic  and  aggregate  shocks.  We assume  a 
process  for individual  income  risk based  in part on  the  estimations  re- 
11. In constructing  the total dividend  series,  we always normalize the level of dividends  so 
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ported  in  Deaton  (1992) and  adjusted  for the  assumed  25-year  period 
length.  Deaton  reports  a  standard  deviation  of  shocks  for  an  MA(1) 
specification  of individual  income  growth  of 15%, and an MA coefficient 
of  -0.4.  Based  on  this,  the  idiosyncratic  income  shocks  for both  the 
young  and the old are assumed  to have a standard deviation  of 45% over 
each 25-year period.  The shock when  young  is assumed  to be completely 
persistent,  so that 
E?(j,t  +  1) =  e(j,t)co(j,t +  1),  (9) 
where  o(j,t  +  1) is the further 45%-standard-deviation  shock to relative 
nonmarketed  income  that agent j faces when  old. In experiments  below, 
we  also  consider  the  situation  in  which  the  idiosyncratic  shocks  of  a 
subset of the population  are correlated with dividends.  This captures the 
possibility  that  certain  classes  of  agents,  such  as  business  owners  or 
executives  who  own  large shares of stock in their own  corporation,  face 
risks that are more correlated with  the market than a typical individual. 
Because  preferences  are homothetic,  when  agents  are assumed  to  be 
homogeneous  only the  o-shock affects prices and portfolio choice.  When 
the wealth  and income  of participants  and nonparticipants  differ, how- 
ever, the income  distribution  of the young  can affect predicted  returns. 
For most of the analysis,  preferences  are parametrized  with  3j  = 0.9525 
and  ao =  5 for all j.  These  parameters  are also varied  in the  sensitivity 
analysis. 
4.2.2  Varying  Participation  Rates  Table 6 shows  what happens  when  the 
assumed  participation  rate in  the  stock  market  is varied  between  30% 
and  100% of the population,  assuming  the preference  specification  and 
processes  for individual  and aggregate  income  described  above.  As one 
would  expect,  increased  participation  lowers  the  equity  premium.  No- 
tice, however,  that the effect is small in the region  of participation  rates 
that correspond  to the  data. For example,  when  participation  increases 
from 50% to 80% of the population,  the equity premium  and the absolute 
level  of  equity  returns  are reduced  by  less  than  a tenth  of  a percent. 
Changing  participation also has a small effect on the level of the risk-free 
rate,  with  an  increase  in  participation  increasing  the  average  rate  of 
return.  This  can be  attributed  to  a precautionary  effect  that  decreases 
when  risk is spread  more  evenly  over the population.  Although  small, 
this effect is in keeping  with  the  observation  that the  risk-free rate has 
risen in recent years. 
Consistent  with  the  literature on  the equity-premium  puzzle,  aggre- Stock  Prices  and  Fundamentals  ?  233 
Table  6  AVERAGE  ANNUAL RETURNS  AS A FUNCTION 
OF PARTICIPATION 
Returns  (%) 
Percentage  of  Returns  (%) 
Stockholders  E(rb)  E(r5)  E(rs  -  rb) 
100  4.42  5.47  1.05 
90  4.40  5.48  1.08 
80  4.38  5.49  1.11 
70  4.37  5.50  1.13 
60  4.35  5.51  1.16 
50  4.33  5.52  1.19 
40  4.32  5.53  1.21 
30  4.32  5.55  1.23 
gate  income  and  dividend  risk  alone  are not  sufficient  to  generate  a 
sizable  equity  premium.  This is true even  under  the assumption  of ex- 
tremely  limited  participation,  inflated  aggregate  risk, and nonmarketed 
income  risk. Still, the premium  predicted  here  is higher  than in Mehra 
and Prescott (1985) by about 1%. Experiments not reported here indicate 
that this difference is due primarily to the assumption  that aggregate risk 
is higher  than that observed  in the data, rather than to limited participa- 
tion or exposure  to idiosyncratic  income  risk. 
In the  experiments  that  follow,  we  examine  other  stochastic  steady 
states  based  on  different  degrees  of  diversification,  risk aversion,  etc. 
Although  looking  across  steady  states  does  not  allow  one  to watch  re- 
turns  gradually  changing  over  time  as parameters  gradually  change,  it 
does  provide  an upper bound  on the size of these  effects.  Thus, one can 
give  a temporal interpretation  to some  of the experiments.  For instance, 
we will compare the stylized  historical past,  with low diversification  and 
low  participation  rates,  to the stylized  present,  with  greater diversifica- 
tion,  more complete  participation,  and greater patience. 
4.2.3  Increasing Diversification  As  a proxy  for the increased  diversifica- 
tion  of  a  typical  market  participant  over  time,  we  vary  the  assumed 
volatility  of the dividend  process.  It is an empirical fact that the variabil- 
ity  of  returns  falls  dramatically  as  diversification  increases.  Based  on 
CRSP monthly  data from 1962 to 1997, Table 7 shows  the effect of diversi- 
fication  on  a typical  portfolio's  annual  standard  deviation.  In monthly 
data, we find an average individual  stock standard deviation  of 16% and 
an  average  pairwise  covariance  of  0.01.  The  portfolio  standard  devia- 234 *  HEATON  & LUCAS 
Table  7  THE  EFFECT  OF DIVERSIFICATION  ON 
PORTFOLIO  VOLATILITY 
No.  of  Standard  Deviation  (%) 
No. of 
Stocks  Monthly  Annual 
1  16.0  55.4 
2  11.7  40.4 
3  9.8  33.9 
4  8.7  30.2 
5  8.0  27.7 
10  6.3  21.9 
20  5.3  18.3 
100  4.3  14.9 
500  4.1  14.1 
tions  reported  in  the  table  assume  equal  value  weights  on  each  stock. 
Monthly  returns  are  annualized  under  the  assumption  that  they  are 
independent.  These calculations  show  that holding  a one-stock  portfolio 
results  in an annual  standard  deviation  of 55%, while  increasing  hold- 
ings to five stocks decreases  the standard deviation  to 28%, and holding 
500 stocks brings it down  to 14%. 
The above  statistics  on portfolio  returns do not translate directly  into 
parameter  values,  since  the inputs  into the model  are income  and divi- 
dend  processes,  whereas  returns  are  endogenous.  One  assumption 
about dividends  that produces  returns consistent  with those observed  in 
CRSP data is that d(t) is variable over time, taking on the values  0.11 and 
0.25 with equal probability. This level of variation essentially  brackets the 
variation  in  dividends'  share  in  total  income,  based  on  the  S&P 500 
dividend  flow  and U.S.  gross  domestic  product  since  1947. We call this 
the  case  of  high dividend volatility. It implies  variation  that  is  approxi- 
mately  consistent  with  a three-stock  portfolio  under  the  parametriza- 
tions we  focus  on. 
Second,  we  consider  a situation  referred to as correlated  high dividend 
volatility. Here the aggregate  dividend  is assumed  to be correlated with 
nonmarketed  income,  taking on the value  0.11 in the low-nonmarketed- 
income  state and 0.25 in the high-nonmarketed-income  state. These first 
two  cases  bracket  two  views  of  the  relation  between  dividend  growth 
and  income  growth.  The first is that there  is very  little correlation be- 
tween  income  growth  and  dividend  growth  on  an  annual  basis.  The 
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considered  here,  there  is a positive  correlation between  dividends  and 
income.12 
Finally, we  represent  the  increased  volatility  in  a poorly  diversified 
portfolio by assuming  a skewed  distribution  of dividends.  The dividend 
share, 8, is fixed at 0.1865 for 95% of the time, but falls to 0.06 for 5% of the 
time, independent  of the aggregate state. This skewed  dividend  case repre- 
sents  bankruptcy  of a poorly  diversified  portfolio.  It is further assumed 
that zero is an absorbing state for the value  of a bankrupt portfolio  after 
this small dividend  is paid. To maintain stationarity, bankrupt shares are 
replaced by new shares in the new  generation.  These new shares are held 
in  the  portfolios  of  the  young,  but  cannot  be  sold  until  the  following 
period.  The reason  to consider  a more skewed  distribution  of payoffs  is 
twofold.  First, although  catastrophic outcomes  are rare for the U.S. stock 
market as a whole,  individual  firms fail quite frequently.  Secondly,  the 
properties of the utility function  suggest  that skewed  outcomes  will have 
a much different effect on asset prices than a symmetric distribution with 
the same variance.  In fact, the implied volatility  of returns in this case is 
set to be similar to that in the case of high dividend  volatility. 
Table 8 is similar to Table 6, but reports results under the assumptions 
of  high  dividend  volatility,  correlated  high  dividend  volatility,  and 
skewed  dividends.  Panel A reproduces  the predicted  returns under the 
base-case  set  of  assumptions  for participation  rates of 50% and  100%. 
Relative to panel A, assuming  high  dividend  volatility  (panel B) has the 
effect of decreasing  the risk-free rate by 0.61% and 0.82% for participa- 
tion levels  of 100%  and 50% respectively.  It increases the equity premium 
by 0.71% and 0.97%, respectively,  for the same participation rates. These 
results  are consistent  with  the  view  that  increased  diversification  has 
significantly  reduced  the  required  equity  premium,  although  for these 
parameters  it suggests  only a slight  decrease  in the level  of the required 
return  on  equities.  For the  case  of  correlated  high  dividend  volatility 
(panel  C), the effect  on the equity  premium  of an increase  in dividend 
volatility is even  larger. 
Notice  that for high  dividend  volatility  an increase in participation  re- 
sults  in  a larger decline  in the  equity  premium  than  for low  dividend 
volatility. This occurs in part because  with  high  dividend  volatility  case 
there is more risk to be shared, and hence a greater benefit from spreading 
12. As one would  expect,  predicted  returns are sensitive  to the assumed  degree  of correla- 
tion between  dividends  and nonmarketed  income.  It is not obvious,  however,  whether 
the  dividends  from a poorly  diversified  portfolio  are likely  to be  more  or less  highly 
correlated  with  nonmarketed  income  than  for a well-diversified  portfolio.  If, for in- 
stance,  households  own  stock  primarily  in  the  companies  for which  they  work  (a 
common  phenomenon),  the correlation may be relatively high. 236 *  HEATON  & LUCAS 
Table  8  AVERAGE  RETURNS  AS A FUNCTION  OF PARTICIPATION  AND 
THE  DIVIDEND  PROCESS 
Returns  (%) 
Percentage  of  Returns 
Stockholders  E(rb)  E(rs)  E(rs -  rb) 
A. Low  Dividend  Volatility 
100  4.42  5.47  1.05 
50  4.33  5.52  1.19 
B. High  Dividend  Volatility 
100  3.81  5.57  1.76 
50  3.51  5.67  2.16 
C. Correlated  High  Dividend  Volatility 
100  3.38  5.87  2.49 
50  3.36  5.95  2.59 
D. Skewed  Dividends 
100  1.54  6.17  4.63 
50  0.47  6.93  6.46 
this risk to new  participants with  no initial exposure  to market risk. For 
correlated  high  dividend  volatility,  however,  changes  in  participation 
have  a smaller effect on the equity  premium  than for uncorrelated  high 
dividend  volatility.  This is because  the new  entrants  are less  willing  to 
bear stock-market risk when  it is correlated with their nonmarketed  risk. 
Finally, the much  more dramatic results  in the skewed-dividend  case 
are shown  in panel  D. The small risk of a catastrophic outcome  reduces 
the  risk-free  rate to 0.47% and  increases  the  equity  premium  to 6.46% 
with 50% participation.  With 100% participation,  the risk-free rate equals 
1.54% and  the  equity  premium  is  4.63%.  This  assumption  therefore 
allows  one  to match the historical equity premium.  It also suggests  that 
in  this  region  of  parameter  space  the  premium  is  more  sensitive  to 
changes  in participation  rates.  This points  to changes  in diversification 
as a potentially  large factor in explaining  changes  in expected  returns. 
4.2.4  Preference-Parameter  Changes  The potential  effects of changing  risk 
attitudes  are explored  by  changing  the  coefficient  of relative  risk aver- 
sion,  aj. Recall that in all the results reported  above  aj is set to 5. If aj is 
increased  to 10, with all else as in the high-dividend-volatility  case and at 
a 50% participation  rate, the  equity  premium  rises by  only  0.16%. The 
risk-free rate falls by 0.3%. It is clear that over the range of risk-aversion 
coefficients  usually  considered,  a change  in risk aversion  does  not  ac- 
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As discussed  in Section  3, increases  in life expectancy  may  affect the 
subjective  rate  of  discount.  Varying  f3j is  a  proxy  for  these  changes. 
Unlike in an infinite-horizon  model,  where  /3 generally  does  not have  a 
first-order effect on the equity  premium,  varying  P3  here influences  the 
equity premium  as well as the general level of returns. The reason is that 
when  /3j increases,  the  value  of  future  dividends  and  nonmarketable 
income  increases  relative  to  the  value  of  first-period  income.  This 
changes  the  share  of capital in wealth  and increases  the importance  of 
second-period  income  risk. For the parameters we  consider,  this results 
in a lower equity premium in levels,  but a higher premium relative to the 
risk-free rate. For instance,  increasing  /  from 0.9525  to 0.9625, with  50% 
participation,  high  dividend  volatility,  a equal to 5, and  i] equal to 0.2, 
moves  the equity  premium  from 2.16% to 2.02%, and the risk-free rate 
from 3.51% to 3.05%. We interpret the increase in the relative premium 
as a response  to the increased  exposure  to market risk. The reduction  in 
the  absolute  premium  reflects the  increased  precautionary  demand  for 
savings  with  the  increase  in  risk,  which  lowers  all  required  rates  of 
return. 
Varying 71,  the  share of nonmarketed  income  accruing to the elderly, 
similarly affects risk and hence  returns.  For instance,  increasing  77  from 
0.2 to 0.3, with  i3j  equal to 0.9525  and all else as in the case above,  moves 
the  equity  premium  from  2.16% to  2.49% and  the  risk-free  rate from 
3.51% to 4.14%. 
4.2.5  Heterogeneity  in Idiosyncratic  Income  Shocks  An interesting  question 
is whether background  income risk (i.e.,  nonmarketable  risk) is different 
for stockholders  and nonstockholders,  and whether  this difference inter- 
acts with  the effect of participation  changes  on asset returns. In Heaton 
and Lucas (1998) we  present  evidence  that many  large stockholders  de- 
pend  more  heavily  on  income  from privately  held  businesses  than  on 
labor income.  Business  income  is more volatile  and more highly  corre- 
lated  with  stock  returns  than  is  labor income.  Hence,  the  equity  pre- 
mium  is likely  to fall more  sharply  if new  entrants  who  are otherwise 
similar to stockholders  depend  predominantly  on labor income.  As dis- 
cussed  in  Section  3.2,  in  recent  years  there  has  been  an  increase  in 
participation  by middle-income  households,  which  are likely to contain 
wage  earners.  We  investigate  the  potential  quantitative  effect  of  this 
change by assuming  a different idiosyncratic  income process for a subset 
of the stockholders  and for nonstockholders.13 
13. Ideally we would  make participation endogenous  and hence  a function of the assumed 
income process,  as in Polkovnichenko  (1998). This tends reduce the risk-sharing capac- 
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Table  9  AVERAGE  RETURNS  AS A FUNCTION  OF PARTICIPATION  AND 
THE  DIVIDEND  PROCESS  (HETEROGENEOUS  INCOME  RISK) 
Returns  (%)  Percentage  of  Returns 
Stockholders  E(rb)  E(rs)  E(r -  rb) 
A. High  Dividend  Volatility 
100  3.74  5.49  1.75 
50  3.42  5.58  2.16 
B. Correlated  High  Dividend  Volatility 
100  3.32  5.79  2.47 
50  3.28  5.85  2.57 
C. Skewed  Dividends 
100  1.18  6.12  4.94 
50  0.17  6.82  6.65 
To implement  this,  we  assume  that  a fixed  number  of  participants 
have nonmarketed  income that is correlated with the dividend  flow from 
stocks.  New  entrants to the stock market and nonparticipants  have a less 
correlated  income  process.  More precisely,  we  assume  that 25% of the 
population  receive idiosyncratic income when  old, with a standard devia- 
tion  of  67.5% and  a correlation  with  dividends'  share  in aggregate  in- 
come  of 0.2.  this group  is always  assumed  to hold  stocks.14 The rest of 
the population  receives  idiosyncratic  shocks  that have a standard devia- 
tion  of 45% as before,  and  a correlation  with  dividends  of  -0.1.  This 
negative  correlation is necessary  to produce  an average  correlation that 
is  consistent  with  data.  In annual  data,  one  does  in  fact  see  a slight 
negative  correlation between  labor income  and stock returns. 
Table 9  reports  results  under  these  assumptions  for high  dividend 
volatility  (panel  A),  correlated  high  dividend  volatility  (panel  B),  and 
skewed  dividends  (panel  C).  In each  case,  the  experiment  is  to move 
from a situation  in which  50% of the stockholding  population  is exposed 
to high background  risk to one in which 25% has this exposure.  Changes 
in participation  now  have  only  slightly  more  effect  than  in Table 8 for 
high dividend  volatility. The effect of a change  in participation is slightly 
smaller  for skewed  dividends.  The effect of an increase  in participation 
on  the  premium  relative  to  the  risk-free  rate  is  higher  in  each  case, 
is endogenous.  For simplicity,  and  to put  an upper  bound  on  this  effect,  we  assume 
that participation  is completely  exogenous. 
14. These  parameter  assumptions  are consistent  with  the  estimates  reported  by  Heaton 
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however,  because  of the greater volatility  of the nonmarketed  income  of 
stockholders.  As in Table 8, the greatest  effect of participation  is in the 
case  of  skewed  dividends,  where  the  equity  premium  falls  by  1.71% 
when  participation  increases from 50% to 100%. 
4.2.6  Simultaneous Changes  As  discussed  in  the  introduction,  each  of 
the factors that we  have  looked  at individually  has been  suggested  as a 
fundamental  reason for the stock price run-up.  We have  seen  that none 
of these  factors alone is sufficient  to produce  a large change  in required 
equity  returns,  and  hence  the  large  run-up  in  stock  prices.  Here  we 
examine  the best case for the model,  simultaneously  changing  a number 
of  parameters.  The  stylized  historical  past  is  characterized  by  a 1B  of 
0.9525,  dividends  as described in the skewed-dividend  case, and a partici- 
pation  rate of 50%. Income processes  are heterogeneous  as described  in 
the previous  subsection,  so that 50% of stockholders  have highly volatile 
income  that is correlated with  dividends.  The risk aversion  a is fixed at 
5, and r is fixed at 0.2. The stylized  present  is described by a  3 of 0.9625, 
reflecting  an upward  revision  of expected  life expectancy,  low-volatility 
dividends  as in Table 6 reflecting  a considerable  increase in diversifica- 
tion, and a participation rate of 80%. All else is as in the past. This results 
in a risk-free rate that rises from 0.17% to 3.73%, and an expected  return 
on  stocks  that decreases  from 6.82% to 4.84%. The equity  premium  is 
substantially  reduced,  from  6.65% to  1.11%. We conclude,  then,  that 
assuming  reasonable  changes  in a number  of variables  simultaneously 
can account  for changes  in expected  returns  in keeping  with  what  ap- 
pears to be the case in the U.S.  economy. 
5.  Conclusions 
In this  paper,  we  have  looked  at a number  of potential  fundamentals- 
based  explanations  for the  recent  stock price  run-up.  In particular, we 
focused  on whether  changes  in market participation patterns or changes 
in portfolio  diversification  are likely to account for a substantial  fraction 
of the rise in stock prices. We conclude  that the changes  in participation 
that have occurred over this decade are unlikely  to be a major part of the 
explanation.  This conclusion  is based  both  on  the  data, which  suggest 
only  small  changes  in  participation  for  wealthy  households,  and  the 
model,  which  implies  that participation  changes  have  to  be  quite  ex- 
treme to substantially  affect expected returns. Increased portfolio diversi- 
fication, however,  is likely to have had a larger effect. There is empirical 
evidence  that households  have  significantly  diversified  their portfolios, 
selling individual  stocks and buying  mutual  funds.  An important differ- 240 * HEATON & LUCAS 
ence  between  poorly  diversified  portfolios  and  a market  index  is  the 
likelihood  of catastrophic outcomes.  When  this difference  is reflected in 
model  parameters,  the expected  equity premium  falls by more than 4%. 
More generally, we  can construct  scenarios  that are loosely  consistent 
with the data in which the required return on stocks falls by 2%. As shown 
in Section  3.1 using  a calibrated Gordon growth  model,  this amount  of 
change  in expected  returns goes  at least halfway  towards  justifying  the 
current  high  level  of  the  price-dividend  ratio in  the  U.S.  market.  We 
interpret this as quite a positive  result, especially  because  it is difficult to 
produce  much variation in the predicted  equity premium  in this class of 
models.  The  model  also  predicts  an increase  in the  real risk-free  rate, 
which  also appears to be consistent  with  the data. 
These  results  depend  in an important  way  on  changes  in diversifica- 
tion and,  to a lesser  extent,  on income  heterogeneity.  There is evidence 
that entrepreneurs  and managers  tend to be large stockholders  who bear 
a sizable  amount  of undiversifiable  risk in the  form of their own  busi- 
nesses.  Still,  we  do  not  have  a  complete  picture  of  the  income  and 
wealth  characteristics of large stockholders,  and we  are uncertain  about 
the  extent  of  their  diversification.  We  also  do  not  have  a satisfactory 
understanding  of how  older  stockholders,  who  own  a substantial  frac- 
tion of the market, view  the risk of stock ownership.  Looking even more 
closely  at the characteristics of large stockholders  remains a useful  direc- 
tion for future research. 
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1. Introduction 
During  the  period  1995-1998  the  U.S.  stock  market  experienced  four 
consecutive  years with real stock returns above 20%. Suppose  as a rough 
approximation  that annual real log gross stock returns are normally  dis- 
tributed and  independent  over  time.  With a mean  and variance  of this 
distribution  equal  to the historical  values  for the period  1871-1994,  the 
probability  of observing  four years  of above  20% returns is 0.4%.1 The 
high  returns  have  come  primarily  from  capital  gains  driving  price- 
dividend  and  price-earnings  ratios to historical  highs  (the latest  num- 
bers from August  9 for the S&P 500 are P/D = 78.5 and P/E = 31.9). Thus, 
even  taking  into  account  statistical  fluctuation,  it is becoming  increas- 
ingly unlikely that nothing  has changed.  The only period since 1871 with 
as impressive  returns was  1924-1928,  with  five years  of above  20% real 
stock returns. Over the three-year period following  that event,  real stock 
returns averaged  -15.4%  annually. 
In the present  paper Heaton  and Lucas ask whether  the recent stock- 
market boom  can be explained  by  changes  in economic  fundamentals. 
Three candidates  are considered:  changes  in corporate earnings growth, 
changes  in consumer  preferences,  and changes  in stock-market participa- 
tion  patterns.  Participation  is  defined  broadly  as  concerning  both  the 
level  of  stock-market  participation  and  the  amount  of  diversification 
among participants.  Poor diversification  is found  to have large effects on 
equilibrium  returns  in an overlapping  generations  exchange  economy. 
The  main  conclusion  of  the  paper  is  that  increased  diversification  by 
itself  can explain  at least  half of the increase  in the  adjusted  P/D ratio. 
This is an interesting  finding,  not  only  for interpreting  the  recent past 
but  also  seen  in  the  context  of  the  literature  on  the  equity  premium 
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1. Introduction 
During  the  period  1995-1998  the  U.S.  stock  market  experienced  four 
consecutive  years with real stock returns above 20%. Suppose  as a rough 
approximation  that annual real log gross stock returns are normally  dis- 
tributed and  independent  over  time.  With a mean  and variance  of this 
distribution  equal  to the historical  values  for the period  1871-1994,  the 
probability  of observing  four years  of above  20% returns is 0.4%.1 The 
high  returns  have  come  primarily  from  capital  gains  driving  price- 
dividend  and  price-earnings  ratios to historical  highs  (the latest  num- 
bers from August  9 for the S&P 500 are P/D = 78.5 and P/E = 31.9). Thus, 
even  taking  into  account  statistical  fluctuation,  it is becoming  increas- 
ingly unlikely that nothing  has changed.  The only period since 1871 with 
as impressive  returns was  1924-1928,  with  five years  of above  20% real 
stock returns. Over the three-year period following  that event,  real stock 
returns averaged  -15.4%  annually. 
In the present  paper Heaton  and Lucas ask whether  the recent stock- 
market boom  can be explained  by  changes  in economic  fundamentals. 
Three candidates  are considered:  changes  in corporate earnings growth, 
changes  in consumer  preferences,  and changes  in stock-market participa- 
tion  patterns.  Participation  is  defined  broadly  as  concerning  both  the 
level  of  stock-market  participation  and  the  amount  of  diversification 
among participants.  Poor diversification  is found  to have large effects on 
equilibrium  returns  in an overlapping  generations  exchange  economy. 
The  main  conclusion  of  the  paper  is  that  increased  diversification  by 
itself  can explain  at least  half of the increase  in the  adjusted  P/D ratio. 
This is an interesting  finding,  not  only  for interpreting  the  recent past 
but  also  seen  in  the  context  of  the  literature  on  the  equity  premium 
1. Using the data from Robert Shiller's home page, the 1871-1994 mean and standard 
deviation  of log(l  +  rt?ck'real)  are 0.067 and 0.17. 
1. Using the data from Robert Shiller's home page, the 1871-1994 mean and standard 
deviation  of log(l  +  rt?ck'real)  are 0.067 and 0.17. Comment 243 
puzzle.  Increased  participation  is found  to have  only  small effects.  For 
readers  who  attended  the  presentation  of  the  paper  at  the  NBER 
Macroeconomics  Annual  conference,  I should  mention  that the part of 
the  paper  which  concerns  diversification  is new  and  thus  was  not  dis- 
cussed  at that time. 
My  discussion  focuses  first in  Section  2 on  whether  the  increase  in 
diversification  is sufficiently  recent  and  sufficiently  large for this  to be 
considered  the main reason for the recent stock-market boom.  In Section 
3 I turn to the  overlapping-generations  model  to address  whether  the 
theoretical  results  regarding  large effects  of diversification  and  smaller 
effects of participation  are likely to be robust. Section 4 comments  on the 
authors'  calibration  of the  Gordon  growth  model  and contains  current 
and  historical  data  for analyst  earnings  forecasts  to  determine  if high 
earnings  growth  expectations  rather than  lower  required  stock returns 
could be driving  the stock-market boom.  Section 5 concludes. 
2. Is the  Increase  in Diversification  Large  and 
Recent  Enough? 
In the overlapping-generations  model  calibrated by Heaton  and Lucas a 
shift from a three-stock portfolio to full diversification generates a decline 
in the mean  real stock return of 1.41 percentage  points  for participation 
fixed at 50% (compare cases D and A in Table 8). This is in fact more than 
needed  to explain  current valuation  ratios according  to my calculations 
in Section 4 below.  Should we conclude  from this that increased diversifi- 
cation is the main reason behind the stock-market boom? From an empiri- 
cal perspective  it would  need  to be established  that diversification  has in 
fact increased from something  close to the level of a three-stock portfolio 
to close to full diversification and that the timing of the increase coincides 
to a reasonable  extent  with  the  stock-market  boom.  The evidence  pre- 
sented  below  shows  that the trend in diversification  started long before 
the recent stock-market boom.  Thus if diversification  is as important as 
suggested,  valuation  ratios  should  have  reached  historical  highs  long 
before the 1990s. P/D and P/E ratios have trended upward  since the early 
1980s, but much of this was a return to normal levels from very low values 
in the beginning  of the 1980s.2 
2. In Vissing-J0rgensen  (1998) I documented  the upward  trend in stock-market  participa- 
tion from around 6% of households  in the beginning  of the 1950s to around 41% in 1995. 
It is too  early to say whether  the  trend  in participation  has  strengthened  significantly 
since  then.  It will  be  interesting  to  see  the  latest  numbers  when  the  1998 Survey  of 
Consumer  Finances becomes  available. However,  the increase in participation since 1995 
would  have  to be  dramatic,  since  the  effect  of  increased  participation  is  likely  to  be 244 *  J0RGENSEN 
Figure  1 STOCK  OWNERSHIP  SHARES,  1952-1999,  FLOW  OF 
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The values shown are for the end of the first quarter  of the year, except for the last data point for the 
split of private  pension plans  between defined  contribution  and defined  benefits,  which is for  the end of 
1998.  The data  are  not seasonally  adjusted.  Mutual  funds include  closed-end  funds. The  category  "bank 
personal  trusts  and estates"  was added in 1969.  Before  this it was lumped together  with direct  owner- 
ship by households and nonprofit  organizations.  Four  small categories  summing to less than 1.5%  of 
the total  for  all years  are  left out of the graph  for simplicity,  but are  included  in the numbers  given in the 
text. These are state and local governments, commercial  banking, savings institutions, and security 
brokers  and dealers.  The  measure  of equity  in the Flow  of Funds  Accounts  is the total  U.S. stock-market 
capitalization  including  closely held companies. 
Figure 1 updates  Table 5 of Poterba and Samwick  (1995), which  shows 
the  proportions  of the  stock  market  owned  through  various  channels. 
The source  of the data is the Flow of Funds  Accounts.  Consistent  with 
Heaton  and  Lucas's  Table 4,  the  share  of  stocks  held  through  mutual 
funds  has  increased  over  the  period  since  1995. However,  direct stock 
ownership  has declined  steadily  throughout  the period. The correspond- 
ing increases are mainly in the shares for pensions  and for mutual funds. 
Stockholding  by  private  and  governmental  pension  plans  increased 
from a negligible  share in the beginning  of the  1950s to a maximum  of 
27.0% in 1986:1. It has been fairly stable since then.  The upward  trend in 
stockholding  through  mutual  funds  started  around  1982 after a slight 
decrease  in  the  1970s.  The  increase  was  8.9  percentage  points  from 
1982:1 to  1995:1 and  4.9  percentage  points  from  1995:1 to  1999:1. The 
mutual  fund share for 1999:1 was  16.5%. 
nonlinear,  with  a bigger effect of a given  increase in participation  at initially low partici- 
pation levels.  It seems  more plausible  that changes  in participation have contributed to a 
gradual trend in returns than that they are responsible  for the recent boom. 
1.00  - 
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Up to the beginning  of the 1980s the growth  in stockholding  through 
pension  plans  represented  purchases  by defined-benefit  pension  plans. 
It is likely  that stock  purchases  by  governmental  defined-benefit  plans 
represent a significant  increase in risk sharing.  The bearers of the invest- 
ment  risk  in  this  case  are the  taxpayers.  Thus  stockholding  by  these 
pension  plans  spreads  risk over a broad group  of households  and thus 
increases  risk sharing. 
Since defined-benefit  plans are managed  by investment  professionals, 
one would  expect them to be well diversified.  It is however  not clear that 
increased  stock  ownership  by  private  defined-benefit  plans  has  in- 
creased the diversification  level of the typical stockholder  to a significant 
extent.  Consider  a world  with  workers  and capitalists where  stocks  are 
in unit  net  supply,  and bonds  are in zero  net  supply.  Initially workers 
save for retirement out of wages.  Workers do not like risk and save in the 
form of bonds  issued  by capitalists  (directly or indirectly  through  com- 
pany  debt).  Capitalists  bear  all output  risk.  A  defined-benefit  plan  is 
then introduced.  Workers must accept a reduction  in wages  in exchange 
for the  pension  benefits.  The  shareholders  of  each  company  take  this 
part  of  wages  and  invest  it in  other  companies.  They  pay  workers  a 
riskless stream when  retired. Thus capitalists still end up bearing all the 
risk. Workers get riskless  retirement benefits  in either case.  In the situa- 
tion  with  a pension  plan  each  shareholder  is more  diversified:  He  still 
only  owns  a small  number  of  stocks  directly, but  now  there  is  cross 
ownership  of  stocks  by  companies  via  the  pension  plans.  Buying  one 
share of a given  company  now  gives  you  the right to a payment  stream 
representing  partly this company's  earnings and partly other companies' 
earnings.  However,  with  cross  holding  at most  equal  to  the  share  of 
private  benefit  plans  in  total  stock-market  capitalization,  this  effect  is 
small. 
Since the introduction  of individual  retirement accounts (IRAs) in 1981 
and 401(k) plans  in 1978, there has been  a shift from defined-benefit  to 
defined-contribution  plans.  In these,  individual  beneficiaries fully or par- 
tially decide  how  to invest  their assets.  The increased  share for 401(k)s 
and  similar  plans  represents  a  significant  increase  in  diversification, 
since  these  plans  typically  offer choices  of  stock portfolios  rather than 
allowing  employees  to pick individual  stocks.3 
Overall, while  the effects are hard to quantify, increased  stock owner- 
ship  by pension  plans  most  likely  contributed  to increased  diversifica- 
tion and risk sharing long before the recent stock-market boom. 
The share of stocks held directly remains large. Thus it is important to 
3. Since  1993, 401(k) providers  have  been  required  by  law  to  include  a broad  range  of 
equity  funds  in the investment  choices.  Large holdings  of own-company  stock remain 
an issue  for diversification  of 401(k) stockholdings. 246 - J0RGENSEN 
consider  whether  diversification  has  increased  significantly  for  stock- 
holders who hold all or most of their stocks directly. Table 1 gives various 
measures  of diversification  based  on data from the Survey of Consumer 
Finances  (SCF) for 1983, 1989, and 1995. The numbers  for 1971 are from 
Blume and Friend (1978, Chart 2-5)  and are based  on a sample  of 17,056 
federal income tax forms. There is a clear trend towards increased diversi- 
fication of directly held stocks.  The share of directly held equity which  is 
held by households  with less than 10 stocks has decreased  from 56.5% in 
1971 to 37.9% in 1995. For 1989 and  1995 the SCF contains  information 
about how  much equity  is held  in indirect form (mutual funds,  pension 
plans,  trusts,  and managed  investment  accounts).  If we  assume  that all 
such  stockholdings  are well  diversified  and that households  with  20 or 
more directly held  stocks are well  diversified,  then  73.8% of household- 
owned  equity  is owned  by well-diversified  investors,  up from 60.8% in 
1989. 
Counting  the  number  of  directly  held  stocks  overstates  the  level  of 
diversification  if portfolios  are unbalanced.  Blume, Crockett, and Friend 
(1974) found  this  to  be  important.  Even  for high-income  households 
with  on  average  18.7  different  stocks,  the  level  of  diversification  only 
corresponded  to an equal-weighted  portfolio  of about  two  stocks.  The 
SCF contains information  about holdings  of stock in the company  where 
household  members  work  or  have  worked  (I refer  to  these  as  own- 
company stock). The  bottom  part  of  Table 1 shows  that  own-company 
stockholding  is likely to be a main cause  of poor diversification.  House- 
holds  with  positive  holdings  of  own-company  stock  owned  40.2% of 
directly  held  equity  in  1995.  Of  their  direct  stockholdings  the  mean 
percentage  held  in own-company  stock was  47.8%. Even if one  allows 
for indirect stockholding  of these  households,  they  still on average hold 
30.8% of their equity  portfolio  in their own  company  [this number does 
not  include  own-company  stockholdings  via  401(k)  or  similar  plans]. 
This suggests  that a substantial  share of the stock market remains owned 
by poorly diversified  households.  It furthermore emphasizes  that under- 
standing  why  so many  households  hold  substantial  amounts  of wealth 
in own-company  stock  is crucial for understanding  the  effects  of poor 
diversification.  Are the results  driven  by rich households  holding  large 
shares of companies  they founded?  Is delaying  payment  of capital gains 
taxes  a key  reason  they  do not  sell part of these  stocks  and invest  in a 
more  diversified  portfolio?  Do  rich  households  choose  to  hold  large 
shares  of few  companies  to have  influence  on  company  decisions?  Or 
are people  simply  overly  optimistic  about their own  company,  in which 
case  poor  diversification  would  not  warrant  higher  returns?  A  better 
understanding  of these issues  is crucial for determining  the general equi- 
librium effects on asset returns caused  by poor diversification. Comment  247 
Table 1  TRENDS IN DIVERSIFICATION  OF DIRECTLY  HELD EQUITYa 
Number 
of stocks  1971  1983  1989  1995 
1.  Percentage  of equity held  directly 
2.  Percentage  of equity held in mu- 
tual funds 
3.  Percentage  of directly held equity 
owned  by households 
with  less than this number  of 
stocks 
4.  Percentage  of equity held by 
households  with half or 
more of their equity holdings  in 
indirect form or at 
least this number of stocks 
-  59.5  41.4 
m-  -  9.3  20.2 










5.  Own-company  stock as percent- 
age of directly held equity 
6.  Own-company  stock as percent- 
age of directly and 
indirectly held equity 
Households  with positive  holdings  of 
own-company  stock: 
7.  Percentage  of directly held equity 
owned  by these  households 
8.  Percentage of directly and indi- 
rectly held equity owned 
by these  households 
9.  Mean percentage  of own- 
company  stock in direct equity 
portfolio for these households 
10.  Mean percentage  of own- 
company  stock in direct and 
indirect equity portfolio for these 
households 
-  26.1  24.4  22.8 
56.5  48.9  44.3  37.9 
-  60.9  55.3  51.7 
74.9  71.9  65.4  64.9 
-  -  91.4  94.1 
-  -  86.0  91.3 
23.4 
74.0  85.0 
66.8  79.6 
60.8  73.8 
17.1  19.2 
-  -  10.2  7.9 
-  36.0  31.0  40.2 
~-  -  23.1  25.7 
65.0  55.3  47.8 
-  -  44.1  30.8 
Note: For the  numbers  based  on  the  Survey  of Consumer  Finances  (SCF) observations  are weighted 
using  SCF weights.  For 1989 and  1995 the numbers  shown  are averages  of the numbers  obtained  for 
each  of  the  five  SCF imputations.  For 1983 the  edited  and  imputed  SCF data file is used.  "Indirect 
stockholding"  refers to stockholding  in mutual  funds  (half of holdings  in combined  mutual  funds  are 
assumed  to be equity),  in IRAs, in thrift-type  plans  as defined  in the SCF net-worth  program,  and in 
trusts,  annuities,  and  managed  investment  accounts.  In line  9 values  are weighted  by  size  of  direct 
stockholdings;  in line 10 values  are weighted  by size of direct and indirect  stockholdings. 
"Tax  return sample  1971, Survey  of Consumer  Finances 1983, 1989, 1995. 248 J  J0RGENSEN 
In  sum,  the  empirical  evidence  raises  two  concerns  for  the  theory 
that  the  recent  stock-market  boom  is  due  to  increased  diversification: 
firstly, that the  trend  in diversification  started  much  earlier than  1995; 
secondly,  that although  diversification  has  improved,  the  share  of eq- 
uity  owned  through  mutual  funds  is still only  16.5% and  a substantial 
share  of the  stock  market remains  owned  by poorly  diversified  house- 
holds.  It  would  be  interesting  to  see  how  large  effects  on  returns 
Heaton  and Lucas's model  generate  for changes  in diversification  more 
in line with  this. 
3. Robustness  of Theoretical  Results  from  the  OLG  Model 
I was surprised by the way  the authors calibrate the poor-diversification 
cases  (cases B-D).  They first use firm-level  return data to determine  the 
effects of holding  a larger number of stocks on the standard deviation  of 
a portfolio  (Table 7). The amount  of idiosyncratic  dividend  risk (and for 
case D bankruptcy  risk) is then chosen  such  that the model  generates  a 
stock  return  volatility  equal  to  that  observed  for a typical  three-stock 
portfolio.  For this amount  of volatility  the expected  stock return and the 
equity  premium  are much  higher  than  in  the  full-diversification  case 
(case A).  But how  do we  know  whether  this is a reasonable  amount  of 
idiosyncratic  dividend  and  bankruptcy  risk?  This  could  be  checked 
against the firm-level  data. In fact, a more standard approach would  be 
to  first use  the  firm-level  data  to  determine  the  dividend  risk and  the 
bankruptcy probability for a typical firm, then assume  that a portfolio  of 
three  such  stocks  was  bought,  and  determine  if the model  generates  a 
stock return (a return to such a portfolio)  which  is much higher than the 
one for full diversification. 
It should  also  be  emphasized  that  the  assumption  of  risk aversion 
equal  to 5 may  be  crucial for the  large effects  of diversification  on  the 
mean stock return. If risk aversion were set to 1, there would  most likely 
be little or no effect on the mean  stock return of either diversification  or 
participation.  To see  this,  consider  the  following  special  case  of  the 
model  for which  a  simple  closed-form  solution  for  the  stock  price  is 
available.  Suppose  there  is  no  idiosyncratic  labor income  risk and  no 
labor income  when  old.  With risk aversion  set to one  (and thus equal to 
the assumed  elasticity of intertemporal substitution),  Epstein-Zin  prefer- 
ences  specialize  to CRRA preferences.  Then each young  agent consumes 
the  constant  fraction a =  P3/(1  +  ,3) of wages,  independent  of asset  re- 
turns. Let A denote  the proportion  who  are stockholders,  wt their portfo- 
lio share for stocks at time t, and P,t the stock price at t. The equilibrium 
conditions  for the  stock  and  the bond  market at t are then  as follows. Comment 249 
Stocks:  Awt(l -  a)(l  -  dt)Yt  =  Pst,  (1) 
Bonds:  A(1 -  co)(1  -  a)(1  -  dt)Yt +  (1  -  A)(1 -  a)(l  -  dt)Yt =0.  (2) 
Equation (2) implies  Awt  =  1. Inserting  this in (1) gives  Pst =  (1 -  a)(l  - 
dt)Yt.  Thus in this special case the stock price is unaffected  by the level of 
stock-market  participation.  Furthermore,  the  stock  price  is affected  by 
diversification  only  because  this  is  modeled  by  a stochastic  aggregate 
dividend  share  (causing  the  wage  share  to  be  stochastic)  rather than 
using  several  different  stocks.  In other  words,  for this  special  case  in- 
creased  participation  [diversification]  affects  the  equity  premium  only 
[mainly] via the bond  rate, with  no  [little] effect on stock price and the 
stock return. Given this, I would  expect much smaller effects of diversifi- 
cation on the mean  stock return if risk aversion  were  set equal to 2 or 3 
rather than 5 (in the end the right number may turn out to be 5 or higher, 
but given  that we  do not have precise  knowledge  about this parameter, 
sensitivity  analysis  is relevant). 
The underlying  reason  that the stock price is unaffected  by participa- 
tion  or  diversification  in  the  log  utility  case  is  that  the  model  is  an 
exchange  economy.  With log utility the propensity  to save is the same for 
all households.  The bond  market therefore requires that stockholders  in 
equilibrium be willing  to lend  to the nonstockholders  as much  as stock- 
holders  wish  to save.  This implies  Awt =  1 and thus,  along  with  a con- 
stant, leaves  the stock price to be determined  by the wage  income  of the 
young.  In an exchange  economy  wages  are exogenous  to both participa- 
tion and diversification.  This suggests  that an alternative way of generat- 
ing  a higher  stock  price  upon  entry  or diversification,  even  in the  log 
utility case,  is to change  the model  to one  in which  the resources  of the 
young  can be  affected  by  increased  participation  or diversification.  In 
Vissing-Jorgensen  (1998) I analyze  an  OLG model  with  production  to 
study  the  general  equilibrium  effects  of  limited  participation.  In  that 
model  (for the log utility case) the riskless rate is unaffected by participa- 
tion,  and  the full effect on the equity  premium  is due  to a lower  mean 
stock return. Wages, the capital stock,  and the stock price are higher for 
higher  levels  of participation.  I recalibrated  the  model  to have  similar 
amounts  of  output  risk to  Heaton  and  Lucas's  low-dividend-volatility 
case.  Increasing participation  from 10% to 60% then decreases  the mean 
stock return by around 0.5 percentage  point.4 
4. The model  is fairly standard.  The results  are not  sensitive  to whether  the  production 
function  is assumed  to exhibit constant  or decreasing  returns to scale. One  assumption 
which  is central for the results  is that in each period,  factor input  levels  and wages  are 
set before  the realization  of uncertainty.  Factors are paid  after output  is realized.  Thus 
the labor share of output  is countercyclical,  since workers  do not take any of the output 
risk. Countercyclical  labor shares  are well  documented  in the business-cycle  literature. 250 *  J0RGENSEN 
4.  The  Gordon  Growth  Model 
Although  I agree  that  a decrease  in  the  required  return  is  needed  to 
explain  recent  valuation  ratios,  the  authors'  calculation  based  on  the 
Gordon  growth  model  to some  extent  overstates  the necessary  change. 
The required stock return in the formula P/E = l/(r -  g) is net of transac- 
tion costs,  and these have declined  significantly. While it is hard to evalu- 
ate costs of direct investment,  Bogle (1991) finds that equity mutual funds 
underperformed  the S&P 500 by an average of 2.1 percentage points over 
the period  1969-1989.  Rea and Reid (1998) find that the sales-weighted 
average of total shareholder  costs for equity mutual funds has decreased 
from 2.25% in 1980 to 1.49% in 1997. Indeed,  declining  transaction costs 
both for direct investment  and for investment  via mutual funds are likely 
to  have  been  a key  factor behind  the  increases  in  diversification  and 
participation  (the issue  of lower  transaction  costs  does  not  arise in the 
overlapping-generations  model,  since  diversification  or participation  is 
changed  exogenously).  Assuming  a  0.75-percentage-point  decline  in 
transaction costs,  the change  in r -  g needed  to imply a movement  in the 
adjusted  P/D ratio from 28 historically  to 48 at the  end  of the  authors' 
sample  is not  2  -  1 =  0.015 but 0.0075,  or 0.75 percentage  points.  It is 
worth pointing  out in this context that without  transaction costs it is very 
difficult to reconcile the Gordon growth model with the historical-mean- 
adjusted  P/D  ratio.  With  a historical  value  of g  around  2% the  model 
implies  a historical  required  real stock return of 2  +  0.02  =  0.056.  The 
actual real stock return was much higher at 8.5% (arithmetic average) for 
1871-1994,  and 9.1% if we  include  the recent period  up to 1998. 
The  authors'  calibration  of  the  Gordon  growth  model  furthermore 
assumes  that  the  riskless  rate  has  increased  by  2  percentage  points. 
Therefore an increase in g of 3.5 percentage  points  (or a g of 13.4% for 10 
years and 2% thereafter) is required to explain an adjusted P/D of 48 with 
a constant  equity  premium.  The most  relevant  interest  rate in this con- 
text is the real interest rate on long-term bonds.  These rates are currently 
high  (around  4% for long-term  inflation-indexed  U.S.  Treasury bonds), 
but it may be premature  to conclude  that they are as much  as 2 percent- 
age  points  higher  than  their historical  mean.  Blanchard (1993) and  the 
discussion  of it by Siegel  show  that fluctuations  in long-term  real bond 
rates have historically been  quite dramatic. 
As for the dividend  growth g, it has in fact been higher than its histori- 
cal average lately. The geometric  and arithmetic averages were  1.5% and 
2.4%, respectively,  for 1871-1994,  but  3.9% and 4.0%, respectively,  for 
1995-1998.5  An  alternative  to  considering  the  recent  past  is to look  at 
5. The Gordon  growth  model  assumes  that g is nonstochastic  and  thus  does  not  recom- 
mend  whether  to  use  geometric  or arithmetic  means.  The numbers  for real earnings Comment  *  251 
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forecasts from market participants. It is well known  that analyst earnings 
forecasts  tend  to be  upward  biased.  Therefore  it is  useful  to  consider 
earnings  forecasts  for which  historical  data  are available  and  focus  on 
whether  forecasts  are higher than usual.  Figure 2 shows  I/B/E/S forecasts 
for two-year-ahead  S&P 500 earnings growth for 1982-1999  as well as the 
subsequent  realization  and  the  P/E ratio  at  the  time  of  the  forecast. 
Forecasts for long-run  growth  were  only  available for a smaller number 
of analysts.  The forecasts  shown  are top-down  forecasts.  This means  that 
the  analysts  were  asked  for a single  forecast  for the  index  rather than 
forecasts for each of the companies  which  make up the index.  The latest 
bottom-up  forecasts  for S&P 500 earnings  growth  are much  higher  than 
the  top-down  forecasts,  but  I do not have  a time  series  to determine  if 
they  are higher  than their previous  values.  The average number of ana- 
lysts  reporting  per year is 10. The minimum  number  is 4. The forecasts 
plotted  are the means  across  analysts.  For each  year the values  are for 
the first month  after the previous  annual earnings  realization  is known, 
usually  March.  Thus  the  forecast  value  for  1999  shows  the  expected 
percentage  increase in year 2000 earnings  over 1998 earnings,  right after 
1998 earnings  became  known.  The  1999 forecasts  are from March. The 
analysts  provide  nominal  earnings  forecasts  but no  inflation  forecasts. 
To convert  the  forecasts  to real terms,  I used  the  annual  inflation  rate 
over the previous  five-year period. 
growth  are  as  follows.  Geometric  means:  1.9% for  1871-1994,  4.0%  for  1995-1998. 
Arithmetic means: 5.0% for 1871-1994,  4.1% for 1995-1998. 252 *  J0RGENSEN 
Several points  are worth noticing.  First, analyst earnings  growth  fore- 
casts  are quite  good.  The  R2 from a regression  of the realized  earnings 
growth  rates on  the  forecasts  is 0.59 for the  real-earnings  growth  rates 
and 0.52 for the nominal-earnings  growth  rates.  Second,  until  1995 the 
correlation between  the  P/E ratio and the  two-year-ahead  real-earnings 
growth  forecast  is  surprisingly  high,  0.87.  But  third,  this  correlation 
breaks  down  after 1995. Earnings  growth  forecasts  have  stayed  essen- 
tially  constant  while  the  P/E ratio  has  increased  sharply.  Thus,  if the 
expectations  of the analysts asked by I/B/E/Sare representative  of current 
market  expectations,  it looks  like the  stock market boom  since  1995 ei- 
ther is driven  by  a sudden  decrease  in required  returns or is a bubble. 
In sum,  the  required  change  in  r  -  g  to  explain  an  increase  in  the 
adjusted  P/Dfrom  28 historically  to 48 recently is around 0.75 percentage 
points.  Dividend  growth  and  (geometric)  earnings  growth  has  been 
higher  since  1995 and  thus  might  warrant  an increase  in the  expected 
dividend  growth rate. However,  at least according to one source,  market 
participants  have  not  increased  their dividend  growth  expectations.  If, 
therefore,  a change  in  the  required  real stock  return is left as the  sole 
factor explaining  the increase in valuation  ratios, the necessary  change  is 
around  0.75 percentage  points.  For given  long-term  real bond  rates the 
necessary  change in the equity premium  is of the same size.  If we believe 
long-term  real bond  rates will be higher  in the future,  the required  de- 
crease in the equity premium  is correspondingly  larger.6 
5.  Conclusion 
Heaton  and  Lucas  address  an  important  but  difficult  question:  What 
caused  the recent stock-market  boom?  They focus  on changes  in stock- 
market  participation  and  diversification.  Having  worked  on  limited 
stock-market  participation,  I found  the  analysis  of the  related  issue  of 
diversification  very interesting.  The references  given  by the authors and 
the numbers in Table 1 above indicate that poor diversification  is in fact a 
pervasive  phenomenon  which  should  be considered  seriously  in general 
equilibrium asset pricing models.  Understanding  why  many households 
concentrate  large amounts  of wealth  in own-company  stock  seems  cru- 
cial in this respect. 
More  work  is needed  to  determine  exactly  how  large  the  effects  on 
6. The  latest  P/D  ratio  of  78.5  is  higher  than  the  value  48 used  by  Heaton  and  Lucas, 
suggesting  that larger changes  in r -g  are needed.  This depends  on how  the P/D ratio is 
adjusted.  Campbell  and Shiller (1998) refer to studies  suggesting  adjustments  to D/P of 
80 basis points  for 1996 and 1997. This would  make the latest adjusted P/Dequal  to 48.2, 
close to the value  48 used  in Heaton  and Lucas's calibration. Comment  253 
equilibrium  returns of poor  diversification  are. In the calibration of the 
OLG model  in the  present  paper,  a concern  is whether  the  amount  of 
idiosyncratic  dividend  and bankruptcy  risk is consistent  with  the  data. 
More analysis  regarding sensitivity  of the results to changes  in risk aver- 
sion and the extent of poor diversification  would  also be useful.  From an 
empirical  perspective  any explanation  of the current boom  which  relies 
on changes  in either participation  or diversification  will have difficulties 
with  timing.  The upward  trend in both participation  and diversification 
started  long  before  the  current boom,  suggesting  that valuation  ratios 
should  have  reached  historical  highs  much  earlier. However,  valuation 
ratios have historically  fluctuated  substantially,  making it difficult to dis- 
cern  gradual  trends.  Aside  from  patiently  awaiting  more  data  for the 
United  States,  it would  be  interesting  to consider  evidence  from other 
countries. 
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reviewing  some  facts  and  then  using  theory  to interpret  them;  I shall 
organize  my discussion  in a similar fashion. 
2.  How  High  Is the  Stock  Market? 
Popular commentary  often uses  the Dow Jones Industrial Average index 
(around  11,000 as I write)  or the Standard  and Poor 500 index  (around 
1,300)  to  track  the  level  of  stock  prices.  Of  course,  index  levels  can 
increase  because  of general  price  inflation,  or growth  in the  real econ- 
omy, or changes  in the size  of the publicly  traded corporate sector rela- 
tive to the economy,  or changes  in the size  of index-included  firms rela- 
tive  to  other  publicly  traded  firms.  Intelligent  analysis  of  stock  index 
levels  must begin by scaling  them in some  way. 
Recognizing  this point,  Heaton  and Lucas discuss  price-dividend  and 
price-earnings  ratios for the S&P 500 index.  Both ratios are high relative 
to historic norms,  but the price-dividend  ratio is far more extreme; it is 
almost  two-thirds  higher  than  its  previous  peak  in  the  early  1970s, 
whereas  the price-earnings  ratio is close to levels  reached earlier in this 
decade  and in several previous  decades. 
Heaton  and  Lucas  focus  on  the  price-earnings  ratio  (scaled  by  the 
historical  average  payout  ratio  of  dividends  to  earnings)  rather  than 
the  price-dividend  ratio.  They  claim  that  "earnings  are likely  to be  a 
more stable proxy for long-run  payments  to shareholders"  (Section 3.1) 
and  that  "in  the  short  run  dividends  can  vary  due  to  temporary 
changes  in  payout  policy  (for instance,  in  response  to  changes  in  the 
tax law).  Therefore,  it is common  to focus  on  the price-earnings  ratio, 
adjusted  for  reinvestment  rates,  to  approximate  long-run  price- 
dividend  ratios" (footnote  5). 
It is certainly true that changes  in corporate financial policy  can affect 
the price-dividend  ratio. Most notably, a shift from paying  dividends  to 
repurchasing  shares can permanently  increase the price-dividend  ratio. 
The Gordon  growth  model,  discussed  in the paper,  says that the price- 
dividend  ratio is the  reciprocal  of the  difference  between  the  discount 
rate  and  the  growth  rate of  dividends  per  share.  A  share  repurchase 
program  causes  the number  of outstanding  shares  to shrink over time; 
this increases  the  growth  rate of dividends  per share and increases  the 
price-dividend  ratio. Share repurchases  account for some  of the increase 
in  the  price-dividend  ratio over  the  last  decade,  although  direct  esti- 
mates  of the effect are fairly modest.  Cole,  Helwege,  and Laster (1996), 
for example,  suggest  that  net  repurchases  have  increased  the  growth 
rate of  dividends  per  share  by  about  0.8%.  Their calculation  assumes 
that shares are issued  and repurchased  at the market price; to the extent Comment  255 
that shares  are issued  at below-market  prices  as part of executive  com- 
pensation,  then the true repurchase  effect is smaller. 
Despite  these difficulties with the price-dividend  ratios, I do not agree 
that the price-earnings  ratio is a superior measure of stock-market valua- 
tion. The problem  is that earnings  are subject to short-term noise  arising 
from the business  cycle.  One  can see  the importance  of this by inspect- 
ing  Figure  1 in the  paper.  Previous  peaks  of  the  price-earnings  ratio, 
close to levels  today, were reached in the early 1990s, the mid-1930s,  the 
early  1920s,  and  the  1890s.  None  of these  were  peaks  in  stock  prices; 
instead,  they were  recession  years when  corporate earnings temporarily 
declined. 
The  issue  of  noise  in  current  earnings  has  been  recognized  at least 
since  the work  of Graham and  Dodd  (1934), who  in their famous  text- 
book Security  Analysis recommended  that analysts  should  use an average 
of earnings  over "not less than five years, preferably seven  or ten years" 
(p. 452). Campbell  and Shiller (1998) follow  Graham and Dodd's  advice 
and smooth  earnings  over ten years.  They find that the ratio of price to 
smoothed  earnings behaves  more like the price-dividend  ratio than like 
the conventional  price-earnings  ratio. It is currently far above  its previ- 
ous peak reached  in 1929. 
Heaton  and Lucas use  the  Gordon  growth  model,  adjusting  the cur- 
rent price-earnings  ratio for the  long-run  average  payout  ratio of divi- 
dends  to earnings,  to characterize combinations  of earnings growth rates 
and discount  rates that could rationalize the current level of stock prices. 
They conclude  that real earnings growth  of 2.4% (1% above the historical 
average)  and  a  real  discount  rate  of  6.6%  (4.1% below  the  historical 
average)  could  do the job. In the rest of the paper,  they  use  alternative 
theoretical  models  to try to hit this target. 
The problem  with  this  analysis  is that the  cyclical noise  in earnings 
should  lead  earnings  growth  forecasts  to  be  adjusted  downwards  at 
cyclical peaks when  earnings are temporarily high,  and upwards  at cycli- 
cal troughs  when  earnings  are temporarily  low.  Rapid earnings  growth 
from  a  starting  point  in  1999,  after  many  years  of  robust  economic 
growth,  is less  likely than Heaton  and Lucas admit.1 Heaton  and Lucas 
could  correct  for this  problem  by  using  the  price-smoothed-earnings 
ratio instead  of the conventional  price-earnings  ratio. 
1. One  factor  that  can  produce  higher  long-run  earnings  growth  is  a reduction  in  the 
payout  ratio. As  Heaton  and Lucas point  out,  the  earnings  growth  rate should  be the 
fraction  of earnings  that is retained  (one  minus  the  payout  ratio) times  the  return on 
equity. If the payout ratio falls, earnings growth  should be expected  to increase.  Unfortu- 
nately  this effect also increases  Heaton  and Lucas's adjusted price-earnings  ratio, so it 
does  not make it easier to account for the level  of stock prices. 256 *  CAMPBELL 
Even though  rapid earnings  growth  following  a period  of strong eco- 
nomic  performance  would  be historically  unusual,  some  commentators 
do appear to believe  that it will occur. Interesting  evidence  on this point 
is provided  by Steven  Sharpe (1999). Sharpe studies  the consensus  fore- 
casts  of stock  analysts,  and  finds  that since  1994 forecasts  of two-year 
nominal  earnings  growth  have  been  high  and stable  (between  10% and 
15%), even  though  realized  two-year  earnings  growth  has been  declin- 
ing.  He  also  finds  that forecasts  of long-term  (five-year)  nominal  earn- 
ings  growth  have  increased  from  10.5% in  1989 to  over  13% in  1998. 
Over  the  same  period  forecasts  of  long-term  (ten-year)  inflation  have 
decreased  from  4.5%  to  2.5%,  implying  a remarkable  increase  of  4.5 
percentage  points  in the expected  long-run  growth  rate of real earnings. 
Of course,  analysts'  earnings  forecasts  are hard to interpret. It may be 
that they reflect a rational assessment  of the prospects  for a "new era" of 
corporate  profitability  in the  twenty-first  century.  It may be,  as Sharpe 
suggests,  that analysts  have failed to adjust their nominal  earnings  fore- 
casts for the effects of declining  inflation and thus are subject to a form of 
money  illusion  first proposed  by Modigliani  and Cohn  (1979). Finally, a 
cynic might  say that Wall Street analysts  do not have  incentives  to pro- 
duce  the  most  accurate  earnings  forecasts,  but  rather to produce  fore- 
casts that justify the current level  of stock prices. 
3. Modeling  Declining  Discount  Rates 
While  reasonable  people  can  disagree  about  the  prospects  for  future 
earnings  growth,  it is almost impossible  to rationalize the current level of 
stock prices without  some  decline  in the discount  rate applied  to inves- 
tors to future earnings.  Heaton  and Lucas devote  most of their paper to 
an  exploration  of  alternative  mechanisms  that  could  produce  such  a 
decline.  They rightly concentrate  on effects that could  reduce the equity 
premium  (the expected  excess  return on equities  over short-term debt), 
since  real  interest  rates  have  not  historically  moved  closely  with  the 
stock market. 
Heaton and Lucas first consider an increase in the stock-market partici- 
pation  rate.  Intuitively,  if  aggregate  equity  risk  is  now  shared  more 
broadly,  then  the  amount  of risk borne  by  any  single  investor  has  de- 
clined, justifying  a decline  in the equity premium.  In thinking  about this 
effect,  it is important  to keep in mind that investors  should  be weighted 
by  their  wealth.  The  right  measure  of the  participation  rate is not  the 
fraction of individuals  who  invest  in stocks,  but  the  fraction of wealth 
controlled  by  individuals  who  invest  in  stocks.  As  Heaton  and  Lucas 
admit,  wealthy  individuals  have  always  tended  to  participate  in  the Comment  *  257 
stock  market,  so  there  is little  evidence  for a dramatic  increase  in  the 
wealth-weighted  participation  rate. 
Heaton and Lucas take the participation rate as exogenous,  determined 
by  unmodeled  forces  such  as  transaction  and  information-processing 
costs.  They  build  a  fairly  realistic,  but  correspondingly  complicated, 
model  to explore  the effects  of the participation  rate on the equity  pre- 
mium.  Unfortunately  they  find  it very  hard  to generate  a large equity 
premium  when  the participation rate is above 30% or so. The reason for 
this is hard to see  in their model,  but Gollier (1999) suggests  a simpler 
framework  that can be used  to gain insight. 
Gollier assumes  a static atemporal market in which  a claim to random 
output  y is traded for a riskless claim. The price of the output  claim is P 
Agents  have  utility u over final wealth  and choose  the portfolio  share of 
the output  claim, a, to maximize 
V(a) = E[u(P +  a(y  -P))].  (1) 
The first-order condition  is 
E[(y  -  P)u'(P  +  a(y  -  P))]  =  0.  (2) 
Equilibrium requires that the total supply  of the output  claim (normal- 
ized to one) be held.  When all agents  participate in the financial market, 
this requires a =  1, or 
E[(y -P)u'(9)]  =  0.  (3) 
If only a fraction k of wealth  is controlled  by agents who  can hold equity, 
however,  then  for these  agents  equilibrium  requires a  =  1/k, so we  get 
E[-  P)'  (k  (  k)  )]  0-  (4) 
Gollier calibrates these  equations  to data on real per capita output  in 
the United  States over the period  1963-1992.  Consistent  with  the results 
of Heaton  and Lucas, he  finds  little effect of the participation  rate k on 
the expected  return of the output  claim for RRA = 2 and k >  0.3. 
To understand  the  source  of  this  result,  I now  take  a second-order 
Taylor approximation  of marginal utility  around  the mean  of output,  g: 
u'(9)  =  u'(y)  + u "(y)(  -  y) +  'u"'()(Y  -  )2.  (5) 258 *  CAMPBELL 
Substituting  into (3), assuming  that y has a symmetric  distribution,  and 
assuming  constant  relative  risk aversion  y, I find  that with  full  equity 
participation  (k =  1), the expected  return on equity  is 
1 
-  1=  -  1  y,  (6) 
P  1 -  y~[1  +  y(y + 1)2/2] 
where  o2  Var(Q)  2 is  the  proportional  volatility  of  output,  and  the 
second  approximation  is accurate for small o2. This can be understood  by 
recalling  the well-known  rule of thumb  that the optimal  portfolio  share 
in a risky asset  is the  expected  excess  risky return,  divided  by  relative 
risk aversion times the variance of the excess  risky return.2 To achieve  an 
optimal  portfolio  share  of  one,  the  expected  excess  risky  return  must 
equal relative risk aversion  times the variance. 
Similar analysis  of the  case  with  limited  participation  (k <  1) shows 
that in general, 
9  yo2  -  1 -  .  (7) 
P  k 
Limited  participation  by investors  who  control  a fraction k of wealth  is 
equivalent  to scaling  up the variance  of dividends  by a factor 1/k. Once 
again,  this  can be  understood  by  using  the  rule  of thumb  for optimal 
risky investment.  To achieve  an optimal  risky portfolio  share of 1/k, the 
expected  excess  risky return must be 1/k times larger than it would  be if 
the optimal risky portfolio  share were  only one. 
Equation (7) has two  important  implications.  First, a change  in equity 
participation  has  a larger effect on the equity  premium  if the participa- 
tion rate is initially low than if it is already high.  A doubling  of participa- 
tion  from 5% to  10% cuts the  equity  premium  in half in just  the  same 
way  as a doubling  from 50% to  100%; and  the  absolute  change  in the 
equity  premium  is  much  larger in  the  former case.  This explains  why 
both Gollier, and Heaton  and Lucas in their more elaborate model,  find 
little participation  effect for k larger than about 1. Second,  limited  equity 
participation  has  a larger effect  on  the  equity  premium  if relative  risk 
aversion  and  dividend  volatility  are high  than  if they  are low.  Limited 
participation  can amplify  a high  equity  premium  caused  by  high  divi- 
dend  volatility  or high  risk  aversion,  but  an  unrealistically  small  k is 
2. This rule of thumb  is exact in a continuous-time  model  in which  the risky asset's  price 
follows  a geometric Brownian motion  (Merton, 1969). Friend and Blume (1975) used this 
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required  to  produce  a  high  equity  premium  in  the  absence  of  these 
conditions.3 
Given  their  finding  that  increases  in  participation  from  medium  to 
high  levels  have  little effect on the equity  premium,  Heaton  and Lucas 
emphasize  an alternative story. They argue that the typical investor used 
to hold  a poorly  diversified  portfolio  containing  only a few stocks.  With 
the growth  of mutual funds  and especially  index funds  over the last few 
decades,  however,  the typical investor is now better diversified.  Diversi- 
fication makes equities a more appealing  investment  by reducing the risk 
associated  with any given  average return. Heaton  and Lucas show  that a 
simultaneous  increase  in participation  and reduction  in equity  risk can 
account for a large decrease in the equity premium.  In terms of equation 
(7), Heaton  and  Lucas simultaneously  reduce  o2 (by a factor of 4) and 
increase  k (by a factor of 2) to get  a much  more powerful  effect on  the 
equity premium  than can be achieved  by a change  in k alone. 
Heaton  and Lucas also argue that an undiversified  portfolio is likely to 
have  a negatively  skewed  return because  any single  firm can go bank- 
rupt. They find that negative  skewness  further increases  the equity pre- 
mium.  To understand  this effect within  the simple framework presented 
above,  one can drop the assumption  that 9 has a symmetric  distribution. 
This  adds  a  term  -y(y  +  1)SK/2k2, where  SK  is  the  proportional 
skewness  of y, to the equity premium in equation  (7). Negative  skewness 
increases  the  equity  premium,  and  this  effect  is more  powerful  when 
stock-market participation  is limited. 
Although  many  investors  are undoubtedly  better diversified  today,  I 
doubt  that this is the cause  of a major decline  in the equilibrium  equity 
premium.  The problem  is that diversification,  like equity  participation, 
should  be  measured  on  a wealth-weighted  basis.  Most  stocks  have  al- 
ways  been  held  by wealthy  investors  who  are more  likely  to diversify 
their holdings.  Even  if the  typical portfolio has  been  undiversified,  the 
typical share of stock is likely to have been held  in a diversified  portfolio. 
Increased  diversification  by small investors  need  not have  a large effect 
on equilibrium asset prices. 
Furthermore,  diversification  can only  have  had a large impact  on the 
equity  premium  if the gains from increased  diversification  were  histori- 
cally large,  certainly much  larger than the direct costs  of increasing  the 
number  of  stocks  held  in  a  typical  portfolio.  Thus  the  diversification 
story creates a new  puzzle-why  were investors  historically  reluctant to 
hold  diversified  portfolios?-and  this seems  little easier to resolve  than 
3. In a similar spirit, Campbell  (1999) uses  the results  of Constantinides  and Duffie  (1996) 
to argue that heterogeneous  risk in labor income cannot have a large effect on the equity 
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the  original  equity-premium  puzzle-why  were  investors  historically 
reluctant to hold equities? 
Both the effects that Heaton  and Lucas emphasize-increased  partici- 
pation and diversification-are  long-run  trends that may help to explain 
why  valuation  ratios are higher now  than they were in the early postwar 
period,  but do not specifically  explain the runup in prices during the late 
1990s. An important  clue,  ignored  by Heaton  and Lucas, is the fact that 
this  runup  has  occurred  during  a period  of  robust  economic  growth. 
This is also characteristic of bull markets in previous  decades  such as the 
1920s and the 1960s. 
Campbell and Cochrane (1999) present a model  of stock-market behav- 
ior in which  valuation  ratios are driven  entirely  by cyclical variation  in 
consumption.  Increases  in consumption  drive up risky-asset  prices rela- 
tive  to  dividends,  not  by  increasing  expected  future  dividend  growth 
(which  is constant  by assumption),  nor by decreasing  real interest  rates 
(which are also constant in the model), but by increasing the risk tolerance 
of investors.  Investors' preferences  are assumed  to display habitformation: 
they have power  utility whose  argument  is not the absolute  level of con- 
sumption,  but  the  level  of consumption  relative  to a subsistence  level, 
which  is a nonlinear  moving  average  of current and past consumption. 
When consumption  is close to the subsistence  level,  only a small fraction 
of consumption  is available as a surplus to generate utility, and even small 
shocks  to consumption  can have  a large effect  on this surplus.  In such 
circumstances,  investors  become  extremely  risk-averse.  As consumption 
increases  relative  to the  subsistence  level,  however,  their risk aversion 
declines  and the equity premium  is driven down. 
The  use  of  habit  formation  to  generate  time  variation  in  the  equity 
premium  is  appealing  because  there  are  other  reasons  to  think  that 
people  judge  their well-being  by relative rather than absolute  consump- 
tion.  For example,  it is common  to compare  a recession  period unfavor- 
ably with  a much  earlier period  of strong  growth,  even  if the  absolute 
level  of consumption  is higher in the recession  than in the earlier boom. 
Habit  formation  explains  this  by  the  fact  that  surplus  consumption, 
which  generates  utility, may be lower in the recession. 
One  objection  to Campbell  and  Cochrane's  model  is that it requires 
high  risk aversion  to explain  the  historical  average  value  of the  equity 
premium.  Barberis, Huang,  and Santos  (1999) have  recently proposed  a 
variant of the model in which investors  are "loss-averse" (Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1979). Investors  derive utility from the level of wealth relative to 
a reference point, which  adjusts only gradually in response  to changes  in 
wealth.  Furthermore, there is a kink in preferences  at the reference point: 
the absolute value of marginal utility is higher for losses  than for gains. In Comment 261 
periods  of weak economic  growth,  investors'  wealth  is close to the refer- 
ence  point  and  the  kink  in  the  preferences  at that  point  makes  them 
extremely  risk averse.  In cyclical expansions,  however,  wealth  increases 
far above  the  reference  point  and risk aversion  declines.  The Barberis- 
Huang-Santos  model  uses  loss  aversion  to  generate  high  aversion  to 
wealth  risk even  with  moderate  aversion  to consumption  risk. 
Both these  models  have an additional  advantage  relative to the frame- 
work  used  by Heaton  and  Lucas. Because  risk aversion  varies  in these 
models,  risky asset prices more relative to dividends  and so the volatility 
of  stock  returns  can  be  much  higher  than  the  volatility  of  dividend 
growth.  This is a feature of the data that is not easily matched by models 
with  constant  risk aversion.  Heaton  and Lucas do not report the volatil- 
ity of stock returns in their constant-risk-aversion  model,  but it is proba- 
bly  close  to the  underlying  volatility  of dividend  growth.  Even  though 
Heaton  and Lucas calibrate their model  with  greater dividend  volatility 
than has historically been observed,  the model  probably understates  the 
volatility  of stock  returns,  and  this  makes  it harder to generate  a large 
equity premium. 
In my  view  cyclical  factors of the  sort emphasized  by Campbell  and 
Cochrane and by Barberis, Huang, and Santos are at least as important for 
stock  prices  as the  secular  changes  in participation  and  diversification 
emphasized  by  Heaton  and  Lucas.  But in  the  end,  it is  important  to 
recognize  that the recent runup  in stock prices is so extreme  relative to 
fundamental  determinants  such as corporate earnings,  stock-market par- 
ticipation,  and macroeconomic  performance  that it will be very  hard to 
explain  using  a model  fit to earlier historical data. The relation between 
stock prices and fundamentals  appears to have changed,  and it may be a 
long  time before a definitive  interpretation  of this change  is possible.  In 
the meantime  investors  should  keep  in mind  that a return to historical 
valuation  ratios would  imply  extremely  large negative  returns,  while  a 
continuation  of current ratios would  imply mediocre returns unless  there 
is a historically unprecedented  acceleration of corporate earnings growth. 
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Discussion 
In replying  to the discussants,  both  authors  agreed  that increasing  par- 
ticipation  rates alone could  not explain  the current level  of stock prices. 
John Heaton  emphasized  that much of the effect of increasing  participa- 
tion  occurs  as the economy  moves  from low  to moderate  participation, 
but we  are now  moving  from moderate  to high  participation.  Deborah 
Lucas  expressed  skepticism  that  adding  capital  accumulation  to  the 
model  would  change  this result. As an alternative  explanation,  which  is 
more  fully developed  in the published  version  of the paper,  she  noted 
that stock investors  are now  holding  more diversified  portfolios,  which 
increases  their aggregate  risk-bearing capacity. 
Mark Gertler asked  whether  there might  be some  benefit  to studying 
stock prices at a more disaggregated  level.  For example,  there is a great 
deal  of  variation  among  stocks  in  price-earnings  ratios,  with  internet 
stocks like Amazon.com  at the upper extreme. John Campbell  remarked 
that explaining  the pricing  of "growth" stocks  raises interesting  issues: 
One  hypothesis  is  that  such  stocks  are priced  high  because  optimistic 
investors  with  upward-biased  earnings  expectations  are more  likely  to 
hold  them.  Another  story is that, as the discount  rate falls for whatever 
reason,  growth  stocks experience  large effects because  of the long  aver- 
age duration  of their expected  earnings  streams. 
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Martin Feldstein argued that it is important to incorporate tax consider- 
ations.  Because  of their tax treatment,  share buybacks  are a much  more 
efficient  way  to pay  out  to individual  shareholders.  To the  extent  that 
buybacks  are becoming  a more  important  share  of payouts,  net-of-tax 
returns have  increased. 
Martin Eichenbaum  asked whether  participation  is defined  to include 
holding  stocks in a retirement account. Heaton responded  that the contri- 
bution data reflect holdings  of defined-contribution  retirement accounts, 
and that the increase in such accounts  may explain part of the measured 
rise in participation.  Jonathan Parker noted  that some  people  who  are 
technically  participants  in the  market at earlier times  held  only  one  or 
two  stocks,  whereas  today  they  might  hold  one  or two  well-diversified 
mutual  funds.  This would  support  the idea that average  diversification 
rather than participation per se is what is important. As another example 
of how  financial innovation  can reduce  required yields,  Michael  Mussa 
mentioned  the "liquification" of the below-investment-grade  bond  mar- 
ket by Michael Milken. 
The identity  of the "the marginal stockholder" was the subject of some 
discussion.  Julio  Rotemberg  suggested  that  the  marginal  stockholder 
might  be very  rich and not  very  risk-averse.  Heaton  remarked  that the 
characteristics  of  stockholders'  noninvestment  income  are  important, 
particularly  the  correlation  of  this  other  income  with  the  market.  For 
example,  if the  marginal  stockholder  is  a wage  earner rather than  the 
owner  of a business,  the reduction  in the required risk premium  may be 
greater, all else equal. 